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THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE MENTALLY ILL: A SELECTED AND
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
JEAN MATTIMOE*
ABSTRACT. The United States Supreme Court over the last decade has selectively whittled away
at the scope and availability of the death penalty by exempting certain groups from execution
under the Eighth Amendment. In 2002 the court ruled that executing mentally retarded criminals
violates the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. In 2005 the court ruled that the
Constitution forbids the execution of individuals who were under the age of 18 when they
committed their crimes. Currently there is an active debate on whether to extend the categorical
exemptions created by the Court to the mentally ill. At the forefront of this debate is the
American Bar Association, which issued a recommendation on the issue. This article presents
research guidance and an annotated bibliography of selected print and electronic resources on the
topic of the Death Penalty and the mentally ill.
Cruel and unusual punishment, Eighth Amendment, categorical exemptions,
mentally ill, mental illness, capital punishment, death penalty, evolving standards of decency.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, the United States Supreme Court created two categorical exemptions to
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. The first exemption was in Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002), when the Court exempted the mentally retarded from the death penalty.
The second exemption came three years later, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), when
the Court extended the protection to juveniles under the age of eighteen at the time of the
offense. In both cases, the Court looked to trends in legislative and jury decision making 2 and
established international human rights norms on the death penalty. 3 Legal scholars have
speculated that the Court may eventually create another categorical exemption for the severely
mentally ill, based on these developments, and the influence of international law arguments
regarding the execution of the mentally ill, hereby exempting them from the death penalty. 4
To date, the death penalty is legal in thirty-seven jurisdictions in the United States: thirty-five
states, the federal government, and the military.5 In the United States as of January 6, 2012 there
were 3,222 individuals sitting on Death Row.6 An estimated five to ten percent of the individuals
on death row suffer from some sort of serious mental illness.7 While most states do not have
specific laws excluding those with mental disabilities from the death penalty, mental illness or
extreme mental or emotional disturbance is often a key mitigating circumstance in sentencing for
capital offenses. 8 Despite this fact, it is generally believed that the current system of fact-finding
in death penalty cases fails to identify individuals with mental disabilities, thereby withholding

*Collection Development/Reference Librarian and Associate Professor at the University of Idaho, College of Law.
1U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted").
2 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16; Roper, 543 U.S. at 565-567.
3
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-578.
4 See Robert Batey, CategoricalBars to Execution: Civilizing the Death Penalty, 45 HOuS. L. REv. 1493 (20082009); Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty,25 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv.
351 (2006); Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking CategoricalProhibitionson CapitalPunishment: How the Current
Test FailsMentally Ill Offenders and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REv. 423 (2009); Bruce Winick, The
Supreme Court'sEvolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence:Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier,50 B. C. L.
REV. 785 (2009); and Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L.
REv. 293 (2003).
Death Penalty Information Center, "States With and Without the Death Penalty", Washington D.C., available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty. Currently the Death Penalty is legal in Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming. States without the Death Penalty include Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, the
District of Columbia and as of 2009, New Mexico.
6 Death Penalty Information Center, "Facts about the Death Penalty" (January 6, 2012), Washington D.C., available
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
7 National Mental Health Association, "Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People with Mental Illnesses"
(June 11, 2006), available at http://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/54.
8 Laurie T. Izutsu, Note, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to CapitalDefendants with Severe Mental Illness, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 995, 1005 (2005).
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the required consideration of whether their mental condition is a mitigating factor in their crime. 9
In fact, it appears that many jurors appear to equate mental illness with future dangerousness,
thereby viewing mental illness as an "aggravating" rather than a mitigating factor in
sentencing. 10
In 2003, the ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities created the American
Bar Association Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty." The Task Force,
which included lawyers, mental health practitioners, and academics, was created in response to
the 2002 Supreme Court decision in Atkins. The Task Force, the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the Mentally
Ill have all called for an exemption of the severely mentally ill from the death penalty. 12 The
Recommendations of the Task Force were adopted by the American Bar Association in August
of 2006.
This bibliography provides annotated references to materials, published after January 2000,
that examine the issues surrounding the application of the death penalty to the mentally ill. It
includes references to cases, periodical articles, books, websites, and documents issued by legal
and professional mental health organizations. It does not include listings for newspaper articles
or popular works. Student notes and comments were not considered unless they were cited in
other scholarly works. The bibliography is not intended to be comprehensive due to the large
quantity of materials on the topic; omission from this list is therefore not a qualitative judgment
about the material omitted.

9 National

Mental Health Association, supra note 10.
J. Tabak, Overview of the Task Force Proposalon Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U.
L.REv. 1153, 1153-58 (2005).
11A.B.A Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Report qf the Task Force on Mental Disabilityand the
Death Penalty, 1 n.1 (2005) (Task Force members included: Dr. Michael Abramsky; Dr. Xavier F. Amador; Michael
Allen, Esq.; Donna Beavers; John Blume, Esq.; Professor Richard J. Bonnie; Colleen Quinn Brady, Esq.; Richard
Burr, Esq.; Dr. Joel Dvoskin; Dr. James R. Eisenberg; Professor 1. Michael Greenberger; Dr. Kirk Heilbrun; Ronald
Honberg, Esq.; Ralph Ibson; Dr. Matthew B. Johnson; Professor Dorean M. Koenig; Dr. Diane T. Marsh; Hazel
Moran; John Parry. Esq.; Professor Jennifer Radden; Professor Laura Lee Rovner; Robyn S. Shapiro, Esq.;
Professor Christopher Slobogin; and Ronald J. Tabak, Esq. (who also headed the committee).
12 A.B.A Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Recommendations 122A (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/policy/2000s/hundredtwentytwoa.pdf; Nat'l Alliance On Mental Illness, Public
Policy Platform of the NationalAlliance On Mental Illness, §§ 10.9.1-10.10.2 (rev. 9th ed. Aug. 2010), availableat
http://www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=NAMIPolicy Platform; Am. Psychiatric Ass'n,, Diminished
Responsibility in CapitalSentencing: Position Statement (2004), available at http://www.psych.org/Departments/
EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/PositionStatements/200406.aspx; Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Mental
Disabilityand the Death Penalty (2006), available at http://www.apa.org/about/policy/chapter-4b.aspx#deathpenalty; Mental Health Am., Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People With Mental Illnesses (2005)
available at http://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/54 (search "Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and
People With Mental Illness").
10 Ronald
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I. CASES

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that if an indigent defendant made a
preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a
significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide a psychiatric
evaluation if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one. Reversed and remanded.
Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan, White,
Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Chief Justice Burger concurred.
Justice Rehnquist dissenting.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of capital punishment on those with mental retardation. Reversed and
remanded. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined.
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court ruled on the admissibility of clinical
opinions, based on hypothetical questions, regarding the defendant's future
dangerousness and continuing threat to society. The Court upheld the lower court
decision, denying a stay of execution and the appellate court's finding on the merits of
the case, reasoning that the use of hypothetical questions in the examination of expert
witnesses is a well-established practice and that the experts failure to examine the
appellant went to the weight of their testimony, not to its admissibility. In reaching its
decision, the Court disregarded the Amicus Curiae brief submitted by the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) in support of the defendant's position that such
testimony should be inadmissible and urging limitation of psychiatric testimony
regarding future dangerousness and a prohibition of such testimony based on
hypothetical data. Affirmed. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Marshall dissented and
filed an opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice Blackmun dissented and filed
an opinion in which Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined in part.
Baumhammers v. Pennsylvania, 960 A.2d 59 (Pa. 2008), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 104 (2009).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Supreme Court
denied the petition of a capital defendant suffering from persecutory or paranoid
schizophrenia. Defendant argued that the imposition of the death penalty on an
individual suffering from severe mental illness was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The court declined to hear or address the case.
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Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that special issue jury instructions
relating to deliberateness and potential dangerousness as a "continuing threat to
society" failed to clearly instruct the jury that it could consider any mitigating
evidence presented by the defendant in deciding whether to impose the death penalty
including evidence of mental illness, substance abuse, and a troubled childhood. The
Supreme Court held that this failure in instruction entitled the defendants to a writ of
habeas corpus even under the stringent review standards of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death PenaltyAct (AEDPA). This case was consolidated with Abdul-Kabir
v. Quarterman,550 U.S. 233 (2007). Reversed. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Chief
Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, and
in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I.
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
A capital case, consolidated with Rupp v. Dickson, No. 562, in which the Supreme Court
in a pre-Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) decision, affirmed the adequacy of the
California procedures to determine sanity for execution. The procedures were vested in
the warden, based on the authority of Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9 (1950). Affirmed,
per curiam, without argument. Justice Harlan wrote a concurrence. Justice Frankfurter
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan joined.
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Case in which the Supreme Court established the test to determine defendant's
competency to stand trial, finding that it is not enough for the defendant to be simply
oriented to time and place with some recollection of events. The Court ruled that
instead, the test must be whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult
with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he or
she has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him or
her. Reversed and remanded with directions, per curiam.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that the admission of a doctor's
testimony at the penalty phase violated respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination because the respondent was not advised before the pretrial
psychiatric examination that he had a right to remain silent per Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), and that any statement he made could be used against him at a capital
sentencing proceeding. Affirmed. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Stevens joined, and Justice Marshall
joined in all but Part II-C. Justice Brennan filed a concurring statement. Justice Marshall
filed a statement concurring in part. Justice Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which Mr. Justice Powell joined. Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment.
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Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court upheld the common law rule that the insane
cannot be executed, concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from
inflicting the death penalty upon a prisoner who is insane. The Court held that the
petitioner is thereby entitled to a competency evaluation and an evidentiary hearing in
court on the question of his competency to be executed. Reversed and remanded.
Justice Marshall announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion to the
Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, and
Stevens joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and V, in which Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, establishing a standard for determining when a
defendant is competent for execution, calling for the defendant to be aware of the fact
of his or her impending execution and the reason for it. The Court subsequently
adopted Justice Powell's concurrences as the correct standard on the issue. Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part, in
which Justice White also joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger joined.
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court, upon the appeal of the defendant's mother,
issued Order No A-453, terminating the existing stay of execution. Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Justices Powell joined concurring, held that there was nothing in the record to
indicate that the defendant, a convicted murderer who had been sentenced to death, was
incompetent and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to seek appeal of
his death sentence and that his mother had no standing to seek relief on his behalfleaving the Court without jurisdiction to hear the case. Justice Stevens, with whom
Justice Rehnquist joined, posited that the defendant was competent and his access to the
courts was unimpeded, leaving no standing for a third party to litigate an Eighth
Amendment claim. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented,
agreeing with the position that only the defendant had standing to challenge the validity
of the state's capital punishment statute and that if he had done so the execution should
have been stayed until the state courts could review the constitutionality of Utah's death
penalty. Justice Marshall dissented, adding that the State failed to determine adequately
the validity of the defendant's purported waiver and the propriety of imposing capital
punishment. Justice Blackmun dissented, expressing the position that the defendant's
mother's standing and constitutional issue was not insubstantial and would call for a
hearing for plenary, not summary, consideration.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
Case in which the Supreme Court held that the competency standard for pleading guilty
or waiving the right to counsel is the same as the competency standard for standing trial
established in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). It is not enough for the
defendant to be simply oriented to time and place with some recollection of events;
instead the test must be whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult
with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he or she
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him or her.
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Reversed and remanded with directions. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and Souter
joined. Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined in Parts I, II-B, and III of the opinion. Justice
Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
Justice Scalia joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Stevens joined.
Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2007).
Case in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the test for competence to
participate in post-trial proceedings, including a petition for post-conviction relief, is the
same as the test for competence to participate in trial. The court held that the key question
is whether the petitioner is competent to play whatever role in relation to his case is
necessary to enable it to be adequately presented.
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
Case in which the Supreme Court held that "the United States Constitution permits states
to insist upon representation by counsel for those who are competent enough to stand
trial, but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves." Vacated and remanded. Justice
Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.
Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court , pre-Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986), held that after a regular conviction and sentence, the suggestion of postconviction insanity does not give a condemned prisoner the right to or require that the
question be tried by a jury in order to constitute "due process of law." The Court found
that Georgia's procedures did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) claim of incompetency not to be executed was not
barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct's (AEDPA) prohibition
against "second or successive" applications and that criminal defendants sentenced to
death may not be executed if they do not understand the reason for their imminent
execution. Reversed and remanded. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice Thomas filed a
dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito.
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, (2001) (Penry Il).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court affirmed, in part, the state court's
conviction on remand from Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry1). The
Court affirmed in part that the admission of a psychiatric report, based on the
psychiatrist's examination of the defendant prior to trial on an unrelated matter during
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the penalty phase did not call for habeas relief. The Court reversed in part, ruling that
the instructions on mitigating circumstances failed to provide the jury with the means
to adequately consider and give effect to mitigating factors of mental retardation and
childhood abuse at the sentencing stage of the trial, as required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments and as mandated by the Court in Penry I. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court,
Parts I, II, and III-A, which were unanimous, and Part III-B, which was joined by
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Thomas filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justice Scalia joined concurring in Parts I, II, and III-A, and dissenting in Part IIIB.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry1).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that executing the mentally retarded
convicted of capital offenses is not categorically prohibited as "cruel and unusual
punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. However, the court also ruled that the
state failed to provide the jury with the means to adequately consider and give effect to
mitigating factors of mental retardation and childhood abuse at the sentencing stage of
the trial, violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Overruled by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court (except as to Part IV-C)
with respect to Parts I and IV-A, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-B
and III, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined, the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-A and IV-B, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IVC. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
Justice Marshall joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Scalia filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, White and
Kennedy joined.
Perry v. Louisana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court reviewed the issue of forcible medication
of a death row inmate with a mental disorder in order to render him competent for
execution. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the decision for further
consideration in light of Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990) per curiam.
Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court addressed the procedures used to determine
restoration of competency for the purpose of execution. The Court dismissed the issue
because there was no federal constitutional question presented that was ripe for
decision. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Frankfurter filed a
concurring opinion joined by Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge.

8
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Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Denial of certiorari in which Justice Marshall objected to the states' application of
Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986). Justice Marshall argued that Fordhad not
decided whether the capacity to assist counsel was relevant under the Eighth
Amendment, and emphasized that "lower courts clearly erred in viewing Fordas
"settling the issue."
Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
A capital case, which was accepted by the Supreme Court in 1965 and which remained
on the Court's docket for thirty years. It was dismissed in 1995. Rees marked the first
attempt by a petitioner to waive a death penalty appeal and forced the Court to establish a
procedure for determining a petitioner's competency to waive post-conviction relief.
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication during defendant's trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that once defendant requested termination
of the medication, the State was obligated to establish both the need for the antipsychotic
drug and its medical appropriateness for defendant's safety and that of others as the least
restrictive alternative available. The Court also held that due process would have been
satisfied if the State had been able to justify the treatment, by showing that an
adjudication of guilt or innocence could not be obtained by using less intrusive means.
The trial court failed to meet this requirement and failed to acknowledge defendant's
liberty interest in freedom from antipsychotic medication. The Supreme Court did not
consider the question of whether the drug's administration denied the defendant the
opportunity to show jurors his true mental condition at the sentencing hearing as the issue
was not raised in the lower court or included in the petition for certiorari. Reversed and
remanded. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souterjoined. Justice Kennedy
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas dissented and filed an
opinion in which Justice Scalia joined in part.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court ruled that standards of decency had evolved
so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among
state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate
punishment for minors, pointing to teenagers' lack of maturity and responsibility, their
greater vulnerability to negative influences, and incomplete character development as
signs of a juveniles' reduced culpability. The Court also considered "overwhelming"
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. This case overturned the Court's
previous decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361(1989). Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice
O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
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Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court, under the framework of Washington v.
Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990), and Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), imposed strict
restrictions on the right of a lower court to order the forced administration of
antipsychotic medication to a defendant who had been found to be incompetent to stand
trial for the sole purpose of making him competent and able to be tried. The Court found
that an important government issue must be at stake to merit involuntary administration
of medication. Furthermore, there must be a substantial probability that the medication
will enable the defendant to become competent without substantial undermining side
effects. Thereby the courts must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to
meet the state's interests to restore the defendant's competency, with no alternate or less
intrusive procedures available that would produce the same results, and that the treatment
is medically appropriate for the inmate's condition. Vacated and remanded. Justice
Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined.
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 832 (2003).
An Eighth Circuit case that addressed whether Arkansas could use medication to
involuntarily render a mentally ill death row inmate competent for execution. The
defendant, legally incompetent without medication, argued that once an execution date is
set, involuntary administration of medication becomes unconstitutional because the
medication is no longer in the inmate's best medical interests. The Eighth Circuit held
that the best medical interests of the prisoner must be determined without regard to
whether there is a pending date of execution.
Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
A Supreme Court of North Carolina decision that determined that the State could not
forcibly medicate an inmate for the sole purpose of execution competency as it is a
violation of the inmate's state right to privacy. The Court, relying on competency
standards proposed by the American Bar Association (ABA), adopted a two-prong test
for competency which differs from the standard set out in Ford. The two-prong test
included a cognitive prong and an assistance prong. The cognitive prong looked at (1)
whether a defendant can understand the nature of the proceedings; (2) whether a
defendant can understand what he was tried for; (3) whether a defendant can understand
the reason for the punishment; and (4) whether a defendant can understand the nature of
the punishment. The assistance prong determines whether the defendant possesses the
"capacity or ability to rationally communicate with counsel."
Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that jury instructions, at the penalty
phase, did not unconstitutionally require the jury to consider only those factors that jury
unanimously found to be mitigating in its determination of whether the aggravating
factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase. The Court
also held, assuming counsel performed deficiently, that the defendant failed to show he
was prejudiced, a key element in a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court
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also held that, defendant failed to show a "reasonable probability," that a better closing
argument without the defects alleged (that the closing argument regarding mitigation
allegedly understated the facts upon which defense experts based their mental illness
conclusions, that it said little or nothing about any possible mitigating circumstance other
than mental illness, and that it made no explicit request that the jury return a verdict
against death), would have made a significant difference to the verdict. The Court
reversed the Sixth Circuit's determination that the state court had unreasonably applied
established law, holding that there was no clearly established Supreme Court precedent
addressing the issue upon which the federal court (6th Cir. Ct. of Appeals) granted relief.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor joined, and in which
Justice Stevens joined as to Part III. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment.
Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (Smith 1).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that instructing the jury to return a false
answer to a special issue to avoid a death sentence did not allow the jury to fully consider
defendant's relevant mitigating circumstances. The Court cited its decision in Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, (200 1)(Penry Il), which held a similar instruction
unconstitutional, the Court reversed finding there was a Penry error and that the
nullification charge was inadequate under Penry II. The Court reversed and remanded,
per curiam without argument. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Thomas joined.
Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007) (Smith II).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that the state court, on remand from
Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (Smith I), had incorrectly ruled that the defendant had
not preserved on appeal a Penry II challenge to the nullification charge, since he only
made a Penry I challenge at trial; and that this procedural defect required him to show
egregious harm, a burden he could not meet. The Court held that the appeals court made
errors of federal law by mistaking the Supreme Court's previous holding and that the
defendant's claim was preserved and the lower court could not base its holding that
defendant needed to show "egregious harm" on an error. Reversed and remanded. Justice
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined. Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined.
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court, pre-Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986), held that where a state policy is against execution of a condemned convict who
has become insane after conviction and sentence, it is not a denial of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment to vest discretionary authority of the prisoner's insanity in the
Governor (aided by physicians), even when the decision is not subject to judicial review
and the statute makes no provision for an adversarial hearing at which the prisoner may
challenge the judgment. Affirmed. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Justice Frankfurter dissenting. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 439 (1989).
An extradition case before The European Court of Human Rights in which the defendant,
facing charges of capital murder in the United States, argued that the United Kingdom
could not legally extradite him to the United States as it could expose him to "inhumane
and degrading treatment and punishment," by exposing him to "death row phenomenon,"
in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECIR). The Court held that, absent an assurance that the
death penalty would not be imposed, Soering's extradition presented a "real risk" that he
could be directly exposed to "inhuman treatment."
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court sanctioned the imposition of the death penalty
on offenders who were at least 16 years of age at the time of the crime. The Court
reasoned that in weighing whether the imposition of capital punishments on offenders
below the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual, it is necessary to look at society's
evolving decency standards. Performing this analysis, the Court determined that there
was no national consensus regarding the imposition of capital punishments on 17 or 16
year-old individuals, leaving the decision up to the states whether to subject 17 or 16
year-olds to capital punishment. Overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV-A, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV-B
and V, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Kennedy joined. Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice
Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
joined.
State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
A Louisiana Supreme Court case in which the court held that the state could not forcibly
medicate a defendant, otherwise incompetent without medication, to render him
competent to be executed. The court considered the case in light of Washington v.
Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990) finding that the forcible administration of medication to
make defendant competent to be executed did not constitute medical treatment but rather
was an aspect of capital punishment. The court concluded that the state's objective in
forcibly administering medication was for the sole purpose of implementing execution
and that the state failed to show that the prisoner was a danger to himself or others. The
Court also held that the state failed to show that the use of antipsychotic drugs was
appropriate medically and in the defendant's best medical interest. The court also
examined protected privacy or personhood interests determining that forcible
administration of medication would violate the defendant's bodily integrity, chemically
alter his mind and will, and usurp his fundamental right to make decisions regarding his
health or medical treatment, thereby constituting cruel and unusual punishment under the
state constitution.
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United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
A capital case in which the Supreme Court held that the petitioner, sentenced to death
by a state court for murder, was not denied due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment when he was allowed to plead guilty, without a formal adjudication of his
sanity. It was not a violation of due process because there was procedure available for
subsequently withdrawing the plea of guilty and entering a plea of "not guilty because
of insanity." The Court also held that it was not the constitutional duty of the State,
even upon request, to appoint a psychiatrist to make a pretrial examination into
petitioner's sanity. The state trial and appellate court records showed a judicial hearing
where, on the plea of guilty, the question of sanity at the time of the commission of the
crime was canvassed. Affirmed. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
A non-capital punishment case, with implications of competency for execution, in
which the Supreme Court acknowledged a "not insubstantial" liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of medication, but held that liberty interest as
limited and balanced against the safety and security interests of the prison. The Court
ultimately found that a state could "treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental
illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will," but only if "the inmate is dangerous
to himself or others," and "the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." The Court
also held that due process does not demand a judicial hearing before involuntarily
medicating an inmate. Reversed and remanded. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion
for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II and the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, III, IV, and V, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White,
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined.

II. REPORTS & RECOMMENDATIONS
A.B.A., CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS COMM., A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS

(1989), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminaljusticesection
archive/crimjust standards mentalhealth toc.html.
In August of 1984, the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards
Committee developed a set of ninety-six standards for dealing with the mentally ill and
disabled in the criminal justice system. These black-letter standards were approved by
the ABA's House of Delegates on August 7, 1984. The majority of the Mental Health
Standards were published in 1986 as Chapter 7 of the ABA Standardsfor Criminal
Justice. New standards on competence and capital punishment were added in August
of 1987 and on competence and confessions in August of 1988. The Standards are
organized into ten parts, including sections on: mental health, and mental retardation;
pretrial evaluations and expert testimony; competence to stand trial; competence on
other issues; nonresponsibility for crime; commitment on nonresponsibility aquittees;
special dispositional statutes; sentencing mentally ill and mentally retarded offenders;
and mentally ill and mentally retarded prisoners. They also include a discussion of the
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post-conviction determinations of competency, stays of execution, evaluation and
adjudication of competence to be executed, restoration of competency, and the right to
refuse treatment.
A.B.A., DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, THE STATE OF THE DEATH
PENALTY: EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS, KEY
FINDINGS, COMPLIANCE LEVELS, AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES (2007), available at http://

www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/ABAStateOfTheDeathPenReptl 03007.pdf.

This is a summary of previous assessments from the first phase of the ongoing Death
Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, which implements the American Bar
Association's call for a moratorium on executions in the United States pending review
in each capital punishment jurisdiction's laws and procedures in death penalty
jurisprudence. The Assessments review whether each state's capital punishment laws
and procedures are being administered fairly and impartially, whether they satisfy
Constitutional standards for due process and minimize the risk that innocent persons
may be executed. The project evaluated eight states between 2003 and 2007: Alabama,
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. These
assessments are summarized in this document. The project is currently in its second
phase with Kentucky being the first of six additional states to be assessed. The
Assessments research thirteen issues (1) death row demographics; (2) collection,
preservation, and testing of DNA and other types of evidence; (3) law enforcement
identifications and interrogations; (4) crime laboratories and medical examiner offices;
(5) prosecutorial professionalism; (6) defense services; (7) the direct appeal process;
(8) state post-conviction proceedings; (9) clemency; (10) jury instructions; (11)
judicial independence; (12) the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities; and (13)

mental retardation and mental illness. While The ABA takes no position supporting or
opposing the death penalty, serious problems were found in every state assessed to
date. Online the report is divided into two documents, Key Findings and a Compliance
Chart.
A.B.A., SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, DEATH WITHOUT JUSTICE: A
GUIDE FOR EXAMINING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1

(2001). available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/finaljune28.pdf.
In 2001 the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities
released these "protocols" to help jurisdictions authorizing the death penalty to conduct
comprehensive reviews of the laws, processes, and procedures relevant to the

administration of capital punishment in their jurisdictions. These "protocols" are intended
to encourage further consideration and implementation of the principles and ABA
policies relating to death penalty administration that are encompassed in the ABA's
February 1997 resolution. The resolution called for a nationwide moratorium on carrying
out the death penalty until severe and pervasive problems in the system were addressed.
Part Two of this work focuses on vulnerable populations in death penalty administration
and includes a section on mentally retarded and mentally ill defendants and offenders.
Includes Appendices.
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A.B.A., SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, RECOMMENDATION 122A

(2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/policy/2000s/hundredtwentytwoa.pdf.
Text of the recommendations and the supporting report of the American Bar
Association (ABA) Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities (IRR) Task
Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty presented to the ABA and adopted
by the House of Delegates in August 2006. In the text the ABA, without taking a
position supporting or opposing capital punishment, urges each jurisdiction that
imposes the death penalty to apply specific policies and procedures as it relates to the
mentally ill. It also resolves that mentally ill defendants should not be executed or
sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense, they had significant limitation in both
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, or they had a severe mental disorder or
disability that significantly impairs their capacity. The Recommendation also discusses
grounds for precluding execution; procedures in cases involving prisoners seeking to
forgo or terminate post-conviction proceedings; procedures in cases involving
prisoners unable to assist counsel in post-conviction proceedings; and procedures in
cases involving prisoners unable to understand the punishment or its purpose. (Also
available as Recommendation andReport on the Death Penalty and Persons with
Mental Disabilities,30 Ment. & Phys. Dis. L. Rep. 668 (2006)).
A.B.A. SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, As APPROVED BY THE ABA
HOUSE OF DELEGATES FEBRUARY 3, 1997: RECOMMENDATION (1997), available at

http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/policy/1990s/ABAl 997ResolutionandReport.pdf.
Text of recommendation #107 and the supporting report of the American Bar Association
(ABA). In the text the ABA, without taking a position supporting or opposing capital
punishment, urges jurisdictions that impose the death penalty to halt all executions until
the jurisdiction implements policies and procedures to: (1) ensure that death penalty cases
are administered fairly and impartially, in accordance with due process; and (2) minimize
the risk that innocent persons may be executed.
AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS,

available at http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/003/2006/en/75c 16634-d46f- 11 dd-8743d305bea2b2c7/amr510032006en.html.
This report, released by Amnesty International (AI), an abolitionist organization, is
intended to illustrate that people with serious mental illness continue to be sentenced
to death and executed in the United States regardless of existing safeguards. The report
reviews individual cases while discussing key points of the death penalty and mental
illness debate. The report calls for the exemption of the mentally ill from capital
punishment and for the adoption of the United Nations Principles for the Protection of
Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care. The report
includes recommendations directed towards government officials and appendices.
Appendix 1 provides an Al report providing an illustrative list of 100 men and women,
who showed some form of serious mental disorder other than mental retardation,
executed in the USA since the resumption of the death penalty in 1977. Appendix 2
provides the text of the ABA IRR Recommendations of the Task Force on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty.
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A.L.I., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON

(APRIL 15, 2009), availableat http://www.ali.org/doc
/Capital%20Punishment web.pdf.
This resolution and supporting report of the American Law Institute (ALI) calls for the
withdrawal and non-replacement of § 210.6 of the Model Penal Code dealing with
capital punishment. The report provides background information, including the history
of the 1962 Model Penal Code's approach to the death penalty, and a review of the
process the Institute followed in reaching its current position. ALI neither endorses nor
opposes the abolition of capital punishment. The report includes annexes. Annex A
provides text of § 210.6, of the Model Penal Code. Annex B provides the text of a
report to ALI Concerning Capital Punishment dated November 2008. This report by
Carol S. Steiker and Jordon M. Steiker was commissioned by ALI Director Lance
Liebman and sets forth, in detail, with supporting documentation, the major reasons
behind the ALI decision to abandon § 210.6. Annex C provides a test of a Status
Report on Capital Punishment dated April 2008. Annex 1 provides the text of a
Motion on Capital Punishment, dated April 2, 2007. Annex 2 provides text of
Memorandum to Members of the Institute from President Michael Traynor, dated May
10, 2007. Annex 3 contains text of a memorandum from the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Death Penalty to the Program Committee, dated October 2, 2007. Annex 4 provides an
excerpt from May 16, 2007 Annual Meeting Transcript (re: death penalty). Annex 5
provides a summary of members' comments submitted to ALI via electronic forum or
otherwise, dated November 26, 2007. Annex 6 provides the Program Committee
Recommendation Regarding the Death Penalty, dated December 3, 2007. Annex 7
provides the text of the Council Resolution (adopted at December 6-7, 2007 Council
Meeting).
THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY

AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HOW THE DEATH PENALTY WEAKENS U.S. INTERNATIONAL

(2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/human-rights/how-death-penalty-weakensus-international-interests.
This ACLU report discusses the impact of the United States' continued use of the Death
Penalty against the world trend towards abolition and established international human
rights norms, especially as they relate to the mentally ill, the mentally retarded and
juveniles (pre Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). The report points out that
members of the international community find the continued use of capital punishment
incongruous to a position of leadership by the United States in human rights and other
international policy matters and looks at the negative effects the continued use of capital
punishment will have on national security and extradition. The report also points out the
impact of international opinion on the Supreme Court, as can be seen in the use of amicus
curiae briefs from the European Union and from members of the U.S. diplomatic corps in
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The report concludes by calling for the United
States to join the international community and abolish capital punishment or asks that the
U.S. to at least establish a moratorium that would prove the United States' commitment
to justice and individual liberties.
INTERESTS
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AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY, MAY 5, 2009
(2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/mental-illness-and-death-penalty.
This overview discusses the gaps in the legal protection for severely mentally ill
capital defendants, including the continued use of execution. Using information from
Mental Health America, the ACLU estimates that five to ten percent of all death row
inmates suffer from a severe mental illness. This outline looks at the difficulties faced
by mentally ill capital defendants throughout the judicial process from trial to
execution, including appeals. It reviews current case law and describes current
legislative efforts to exempt those who suffer from a serious mental illness from
capital punishment.
AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, ET AL., BREACH OF TRUST: PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN

(1994), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1994/03/01/breach-trust.
This report by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), along with the American College of
Physicians, the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, and Human Rights
Watch, discusses and gives a brief history of the participation of physicians in executions
and the conflict with ethical standards. The report includes a review of medical
organizations' and state medical societies' responses to physician participation in
executions; a state-by-state summary of state statutes and regulations concerning the
death penalty and physicians; case studies obtained through interviews with witnesses
and physicians; an ethical study of the participation problem, paying special attention to
psychiatric evaluation and treatment of the condemned; an analysis of the ethical
foundations prohibiting participation; and recommendations against participation with
capital punishment.

EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DEATH SENTENCES FOR PERSONS WITH DEMENTIA OR TRAUMATIC

(2005), available at http://www.psychiatry.org/advocacy-newsroom/position-statements/apa-position-statements.
This position statement by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), developed in
close collaboration with the American Bar Association Task Force on Mental Disability
and the Death Penalty, is intended to urge courts and legislatures to extend the Supreme
Court's ruling in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to two other disorders involving
equivalent levels of impairment-dementia and traumatic brain injury. The position
statement states that "Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the
time of the offense, they had significant limitations in both their intellectual functioning
and adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills,
resulting from mental retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury."
BRAIN INJURY: POSITION STATEMENT

AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IN CAPITAL SENTENCING: POSITION

(2004), available at http://www.psychiatry.org/advocacy--newsroom/positionstatements/apa-position-statements.
This position statement by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), developed in
close collaboration with the American Bar Association Task Force on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty, deals with diminished responsibility in capital
sentencing and states the APA's position that defendants should not be sentenced to
STATEMENT
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death in capital cases or executed if, at the time of the offense, they suffer from a
severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs their capacity to
understand the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their behavior, to apply
rational judgment in relation to their behavior, or to conform their behavior to the
tenets of the law. The position statement goes on to state that a disorder typified
primarily by repeated criminal conduct or due solely to the acute voluntary abuse of
alcohol or other drugs is not alone enough to constitute a mental disorder or disability
under the provision. Includes commentary.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS ON DEATH Row: POSITION STATEMENT

(2005), available at http://www.psychiatry.org/advocacy--newsroom/position-statements/apaposition-statements.
This position statement by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), developed in
close collaboration with the American Bar Association Task Force on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty, addresses three different situations under which
concerns about a death penalty defendant's mental competency and suitability for
execution become factors post sentencing. The first section states that a sentence of
death should be precluded when a prisoner has a mental disorder or disability affecting
their capacity to: (i) make a rational decision to forgo or terminate post-conviction
proceedings; (ii) assist counsel and communicate pertinent information during postconviction adjudication; or (iii) understand and appreciate the nature or purpose of an
impending execution, or the reason for the imposition of punishment. The following
paragraphs clarify these situations and discuss procedural issues.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS ON DEATH

Row, SUPPLEMENT: POSITION

(2005), available at http://www.psychiatry.org/advocacy--newsroom/positionstatements/apa-position-statements.
Further commentary and references supporting the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) position statement, Mentally Il Prisonerson Death Row, listed above.
STATEMENT

AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, MORATORIUM ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:

(2000), available at http://www.psychiatry.org/advocacy-newsroom/position-statements/apa-position-statements.
This position statement by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), takes into
consideration the recommendation of the American Bar Association (ABA), and calls
for a moratorium on capital punishment in the United States until jurisdictions seeking
to reform capital punishment establish new policies and procedures to assure that the
death penalty is administered "fairly and impartially" in accord with due process. The
APA expressly identifies weaknesses and deficiencies perceived in the current capital
punishment system, specifically in regard to the mentally ill and developmentally
disabled.
POSITION STATEMENT

(Aug. 2001),
available at http://www.apa.org/about/policy/death-penalty.aspx.
This is a policy statement by the American Psychological Association (APA) calling
for a moratorium by United States jurisdictions that impose the death penalty. This
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
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resolution calls for the halt of all executions until policy and procedure
implementations can be made to address nine specific problems identified by the
Association in current capital punishment cases. The identified problems include:
death penalty prosecutions that may involve persons with serious mental illness or
mental retardation; procedural problems, such as assessing competency; and issues
involving mitigation. Includes references.
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY (2006), available

at http://www.apa.org/about/policy/chapter-4b.aspx#death-penalty.
This position statement by the American Psychological Association (APA), developed in
close collaboration with the American Bar Association Task Force on Mental Disability
and the Death Penalty, urges jurisdictions that impose capital punishment not to execute
certain persons with mental disabilities under the following circumstances: persistent
mental disability; mental disorder or disability at the time of the offense; and mental
disorder or disability after imposition of death sentence. The statement also includes
grounds for precluding execution and procedures to be followed in the above
circumstances. The position statement notes that adoption of these recommendations is
not intended to supersede or alter existing APA policy on the death penalty (e.g.,
Resolution on the Death Penalty in the United States).
(2006),
available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/30.pdf.
The Constitution Project, based in Washington, D.C., develops bipartisan solutions to
contemporary constitutional and governance issues by combining high-level scholarship
and public education. In 2000, the Constitution Project created a blue-ribbon committee
on the Death Penalty. The Committee's members were supporters and opponents of the
death penalty and included judges, prosecutors, policymakers, victim advocates, defense
lawyers, journalists, and scholars-all of whom expressed profound concern that despite
procedural safeguards and other assurances of fundamental fairness in the administration
of capital punishment, the system had become deeply flawed. In 2001, the Committee
releasedMandatory Justice: Eighteen Reforms to the Death Penalty, which contains the
consensus recommendations of the group. The group, however, predicted that additional
experience, study, and reflection might require further recommendations. Those new
recommendations are contained in this report and fall into three categories. First are
recommendations that address changes in the law since Mandatory Justice was issued in
2001, which include the decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Second are those that address new areas that committee
members identified as contributing to errors and injustices. Third are those
recommendations that remain unchanged because the problems they were meant to
address still exist. While not included in the first set of recommendations in 2001, the
2006 recommendation includes Recommendation Seven, which calls for the prohibition
of executions in cases involving individuals with mental illness.
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY REVISITED

United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60/Add.1 (Dec. 23, 1996), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
issues/executions/annual.htm.
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This report, filed by the Commission on Human Rights, contains the report of the Special
Rapporteur, who does much of the monitoring and fact finding work of the Commission.
Each year, the Special Rapporteur releases a report on extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions. In 1997, the Special Rapporteur stated a special concern regarding
the "imposition and application of the death penalty on persons reported to be mentally
retarded or mentally ill" in the United States.
PositionStatement 54: Death Penalty andPeople with Mental Illnesses, MENTAL HEALTH
AMERICA, (June 11, 2006), available at http://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/54.
This position statement, released by Mental Health America, calls upon states "to
suspend using the death penalty until more just, accurate and systematic ways of
determining and considering a defendant's mental status are developed." The statement
sets forth that defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of
the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired
their capacity to appreciate the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of their conduct; or
if they had significant limitations in both their intellectual functioning and adaptive
behavior. Includes commentary.
Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 62/149, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/149(Feb.
26, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r62.shtml.
The moratorium was adopted by the General Assembly by a 104-54 vote on the report of
the Third Committee (A/62/439/Add.2). The United States opposed passage, arguing
each nation should be left to choose for itself on the issue. Two previous attempts in 1994
and 1999 to have the General Assembly adopt a moratorium on the death penalty failed.
PUBLIC POLICY PLATFORM OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, NATIONAL

§§ 10.9.1-10.10.2 (2008), available at http://www.nami.org/
template.cfm?section=NAMI Policy Platform.
This sixty-page policy statement is released by the National Alliance on Mental Illness
(NAMI), an organization of individuals with serious mental illnesses and their family
members who advocate for research and services in response to major illnesses that affect
the brain. It includes sections on the death penalty and the insanity defense. Id. at §§
10.9.1-10.10.2. NAMI's primary function is to provide support, educate, and advocate;
through research and service professionals, providers, and the general public; on the
issues that affect people with serious mental illnesses.
ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS

The Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A.
Res. 46/119, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/119 (Dec. 17, 1991), availableat http://www.un.org/Depts/
dhl/resguide/r46.htm.
These principles, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 46/119 on December
17, 1991, call for the protection of a person with mental illness and the improvement
of mental health care. They include definitions and twenty-five principles dealing with
fundamental freedoms and basic rights.
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Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8,
1990, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-53.html.
This protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty was adopted by The Organization of American States, which includes the United
States. The Protocol holds that the trend among American nations is in favor of abolition
of capital punishment, and calls for an international agreement to abolish the death
penalty in the Americas. The Protocol has been ratified by eleven countries including:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. The United States is not a signatory.
United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2005/59 (Apr. 20, 2005) available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/
CHR/resolutions/E-CN 4-RES-2005-59.doc.
This resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights calls for an end
to the use of the death penalty against the mentally ill. In 2005, the United Nations
adopted these resolutions, which call for all states that still maintain the death penalty
"[n]ot to impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any mental or
intellectual disabilities or to execute any such person," thereby, encompassing both the
mentally ill and the mentally retarded.
U.N. Secretary-General, CapitalPunishment and Implementation of the Safeguards
GuaranteeingProtection of the Rights of Those Facingthe Death Penalty: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral,U.N. Doc. E/20 10/10 (Dec. 18, 2009) available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/
ws.asp?m=E/2010/10.
This report, the eighth quinquennial report of the Secretary-General on capital
punishment, covers the period from 2004-08 and reviews developments in the use of
capital punishment. The report also lists recommendations for safeguards for the
protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty in general and, under the third
safeguard, calls for the prohibition of executions of "persons who have become insane."
The issuing body, the Economic and Social Council, has recommended that Member
States eliminate the death penalty "for persons suffering from mental retardation or
extremely limited mental competence." The protection applies even when a person's
insanity developed subsequent to conviction and sentence of death, without regard to
competency at the time of the crime or of trial. The report also notes a marked
international trend towards abolition and restriction of the use of capital punishment in
most countries.
III. BOOKS
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

(rev. 4th ed. 2000).
The 943-page Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders fourth edition
text revised (DSM-IV-TR) is published by the American Psychiatric Association. This
revision of the fourth edition of the manual sets forth diagnostic criteria, descriptions,
and other information to guide the classification and diagnosis of mental disorders.
Published in 2000, this edition replaces DSM-IV, and is expected to be replaced by
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DSM-V in the near future. DSM-IV-TR provides a common language and standard
criteria for the classification of mental disorders. The manual begins with instructions
concerning its use, followed by the DSM-IV-TR classification list with official codes
and categories. The text also includes a description of the DSM-IV Multiaxial
Assessment System and over 700 pages of diagnostic criteria and descriptive text for
each of the DSM-IV disorders. Includes index and appendices.
MARGARET VANDIVER, ET AL., "LETS Do IT!": AN ANALYSIS OF CONSENSUAL EXECUTIONS, IN
THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 187 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 2008).

This chapter provides a statistical overview of prisoners who have waived their rights
to post-conviction review. It includes information regarding consensual executions
before and after the Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238
(1972), and an exploration of the categories under Durkheim's theory of suicide,
Suicide, a Study in Sociology, and how they relate to consensual executions. The
chapter also includes an examination of the motivation for volunteering for execution,
including a section on the mentally ill and discussion on "death row syndrome."
Includes tables, notes, references, and a list of cited cases.
ALFRED B. HEILBRUN, JR., THE DEATH PENALTY: BEYOND THE SMOKE AND MIRRORS (2006).

This book attempts to clarify, through evidence and reasoning, whether the presence of
death penalty statutes provides a social benefit by limiting homicidal behavior, and
whether the death penalty can be adjudicated fairly and in a manner consistent with
contemporary values. Chapter Six: "Fair Practice in Adjudicating the Death Penalty:
Mental Disorder as a Competence Issue" looks at competency and mental impairment
and includes discussion on three issues that may stand in the way of just sentencing:
assessment reliability, the determination of competence at the time of the offense, and
the theory of dangerousness. Includes tables and references.
ROGER G. HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE

(rev. 4th ed. 2008).
This book, now in its fourth edition, began as a report to the United Nations
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control in 1988, and serves as a study on the
question of the death penalty and the latest contributions of the criminal sciences in the
matter, bringing up to date the survey of world trends on the issue. The fourth edition
relies on responses to the seventh Quinquennial Survey of the United Nations (UN)
and covers the years 1999-2003, as well as other sources of information from the UN.
Chapter Six: "Excluding the Vulnerable from Capital Punishment" includes a section
titled: "Protection of the Insane and Severely Mentally Ill," and discusses the
implementation of safeguards to protect those who commit capital crimes while
mentally ill, focusing separately on the mentally ill at the time of conviction and
mental illness after conviction, or competence to be executed. Includes appendices,
index, bibliography, and a list of cases cited.
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BARRY LATZER & DAVID McCoRD, DEATH PENALTY CASES: LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT
CASES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (3d ed. 2010).
This book contains excerpts of U.S. Supreme Court cases on the death penalty. It also

contains a brief history of the Eighth Amendment, capital laws and procedures,
discussion on the extralegal debate, and references. Appendix A contains facts and
figures on murder and the death penalty. Appendix B contains selected death penalty
statutes. Relevant cases include Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Fordv.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS:
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (3d ed. 2007).

A HANDBOOK FOR

This book deals with forensic psychology and is aimed at mental health professionals
who perform evaluations and lawyers and judges, who request evaluations. It is intended
as a comprehensive guide to issues that the legal system has most commonly asked
clinicians to address. The book is divided into five parts, one of which is "The Criminal
Process," which includes chapters on "Competency to Stand Trial," "Other Competencies
in the Criminal Process," "Mental State at the Time of the Offense," and "Sentencing."
This work also contains a section on "Communicating with the Courts," which includes
sample reports. Each chapter has a separate bibliography and the work includes a
glossary, index, and notes.
JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY:
A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND CRIMINAL
PROFESSIONALS (2009).

This book, sponsored by the American Bar Association (ABA), Commission on
Mental and Physical Disability Law, synthesizes the best and most recent information
regarding mental health and discrimination law as they pertain to criminal justice
matters. The manual uses resources from the American Bar Association, referencing
the ABA's CriminalJustice Mental Health Standards and information from the Mental
& PhysicalDisability Law Reporter, Mental DisabilityLaw, Evidence and Testimony
and Disability DiscriminationLaw, and Evidence and Testimony. This book is divided
into three parts. Part I: "Overview," which introduces mental health and disability in
the context of broad criminal justice concerns and includes discussion on the legal
history of mental health and disability in the criminal justice system and key terms,
concepts, developments and considerations. Part II: "Substantive Law and Standards"
provides discussion on criminal incompetency, insanity and diminished culpability,
dangerousness in the criminal law and jails, prisons and secure "treatment" facilities,
as well as information on conditions of confinement and release. Part III: "Expert
Evidence and Testimony" covers pretrial, courtroom, and appellate evidence and
testimony of forensics experts who participate in the mental health and disability
related legal proceedings, including discussion on admissibility of expert evidence and
testimony, mental health diagnoses and assessments, criminal incompetency, evidence
of insanity and diminished culpability, dangerousness to others and self, care and
treatment of inmates, and disability discrimination involving inmates in corrections
facilities. The manual also includes a glossary of key terms, a table of cases and a
subject index.
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RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, ET AL., THE DEATH PENALTY: AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH CAPITAL

(2008).
This book addresses the contemporary issues surrounding the death penalty, covering
legal, historical, philosophical, economic, sociological, and religious points of view. The
book is divided into four parts, each with a separate introduction. Part One: "The
Enduring Legacy of Capital Punishment in the United States," covers the development of
the death penalty in America from 1608 to the present. Part Two: "Legal History,
Constitutional Requirements, and Common Justifications for Capital Punishment in the
United States," provides constitutional history and an introduction to the death penalty
with discussion on the execution of special groups including the mentally ill. Part Three:
"The Administration of the Death Penalty: Issues of Race and Human Fallibility,"
discusses the problems associated with the administration of the death penalty. Part Four:
"What's to Come of the Death Penalty" looks to the future. Each chapter includes
teaching aids and endnotes. Work also includes references, a name index, case index,
subject index, and a forward by Stephen B. Bright.

PUNISHMENT

F. SCHOPP, ET AL., MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW: RESPONSIBILITY,
PUNISHMENT AND COMPETENCE (2009).
ROBERT

This book deals with mental disorder and criminal law and examines the integration of
justificatory and empirical inquiry in the context of criminal competence and
responsibility. Its intent is to lead the reader through a series of steps to gradually
advance their understanding of the topic and promote ongoing interdisciplinary
research. The book is divided into three parts, Part I: "Mental Disorder and the
Criminal Process;" Part II: "Judgments of Dangerousness and the Criminal Process;"
and Part III: "Competence to Face Execution and the Roles of the Psychological
Professions;" and includes an introduction to the topic with notes. Of special note to
this bibliography is the second section of Part I, by Bruce J. Winick, "Determining
When Severe Mental Illness Should Disqualify a Defendant from Capital
Punishment." Includes index.
RONALD

S. HONBERG, THE INTERSECTION OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND CRIMINAL LAW IN THE
321

CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: CRISIS & OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

(2008).
This chapter identifies several situations in the criminal process system under which
mental illness can become a factor. The chapter includes discussion on legal competency
in criminal cases, the standard for determining competency to stand trial, the insanity
defense, the rights of prisoners to refuse treatment, and a section on people with mental
illness and the death penalty. The chapter includes separate references and the work
includes a name index, case index, and subject index.
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL

(2006).
This book offers an examination of the laws governing the punishment, detention, and
protection of people with mental disabilities. It is intended to advance new ways of
thinking about the state's legal authority to deprive life and liberty to the mentally
disordered and argues for a complete overhaul of the insanity defense, the abandonment
of the guilty but mentally ill verdict, and a prohibition of the execution of the mentally ill.

DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY
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Of special note for this bibliography is Chapter Three: "Mental Disability and the Death
Penalty," which advances three reasons why the death penalty should never or rarely be
imposed on the mentally ill, including an Equal Protection argument, a due process
argument, and an Eighth Amendment argument. The work includes extensive notes and
an index.
KENNETH WILLIAMS, MOST DESERVING OF DEATH?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S

(2012).
This book offers an analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment on the issue of the death
penalty and its goal of reserving the death penalty for the worst offenders-those "most
deserving of death." It is not intended as a promotion for or against abolition rather as a
means of providing the reader with a better understanding of the issues surrounding the
use of capital punishment. The book is divided into nine chapters. Of special note to this
bibliography is Chapter 5 on Mental Illness. The work includes tables and an index.

DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE

IV. ARTICLES

Am. Civil Liberties Union, CapitalPunishmentProject,Death Penalty 101 (2007), availableat
http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/death-penalty- 101.
This brief article provides a concise overview of the current state of the death penalty in
the United States. The article finds in part that the United States' capital punishment
process "is arbitrary and capricious, including its use against the mentally ill..." The
article includes death penalty statistics, a list of important Supreme Court cases, and a
review of the states' and federal government's current positions on the death penalty.
Robert Batey, CategoricalBars to Execution: Civilizing the Death Penalty, 45 Hous. L. REV.
1493 (2009).
This article discusses how the Supreme Court has used the creation of categorical bars to
slowly eliminate certain classes of individuals from the death penalty, bringing the
United States more closely in line with international death penalty norms. The article
reviews the more recent decisions establishing these limits and uses these decisions as
models for analysis. Dividing the analysis into three categories: Established (mental
retardation and youth); Incomplete (Non-homicides and lack of intent to kill); and
Emerging Categorical Bars (Seriously Mentally Ill). The author focuses on what has been
accomplished and what remains to be done in future decisions, ultimately advocating that
the death penalty be limited to the crime of murder and the bar be extended only to those
suffering from mental illness at the time they committed their crimes.
Anthony N. Bishop, The Death Penalty in the United States: A InternationalHuman Rights
Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115 (2001-2002).
This article reviews the United States' contradictory policy on human rights, under
which the US declares itself committed to human rights and criticizes other countries
for their human rights policies while maintaining a retentionist position on the use of
the death penalty. It is intended to provide practitioners and judges with limited
knowledge of international death penalty law with the basic resources necessary to
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understand international law arguments regarding the death penalty. The author
includes discussion on the mentally retarded and the mentally ill. The article also
discusses some of the likely consequences of the United States' continuing rejection of
international human rights norms.
John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, the Volitionally
Incapacitated,and the Death Penalty, 55 S. C. L. REv. 93 (Fall 2003).
This article considers the Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002) and its implications for mentally ill defendants. It includes a brief synopsis of
State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992) and a short summary of pertinent
Eighth Amendment law. The authors review the Atkins decision, applying the Atkins
rationale to individuals suffering from volitional incapacity before discussing the
broader implications of Atkins to other seriously mentally ill offenders. The authors
conclude by determining that the benefits of Atkins are at best incremental and that
while the Atkins methodology would likely be applicable to the volitionally
incapacitated, the hope that it would extend to those who suffer from mental illness but
are able to control their conduct as the next categorical exemption to the death penalty
is likely to remain unrealized. Includes Charts (circa. 2003) summarizing state laws on
death penalty ineligibility or eligibility for defendants with volitional incapacity.
John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers, "Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L.
REv. 939 (2005).
This article discusses the topic of "volunteers,"-death-row inmates who either refuse
to present mitigating evidence or waive their rights to post-conviction review, actions
that call into question whether the individual is mentally healthy and accepting just
punishment or suffering from mental disease and therefore incompetent to waive their
rights. The article summarizes current legal standards on volunteering and assisted
suicide, and explores comparisons between the characteristics of volunteers and nonincarcerated suicidal individuals. The article goes on to propose a standard for
assessing waiver requests, taking into account possible suicidal ideation and mental
competency. The author concludes that motivation must be examined for each
"volunteer" individually to find if the inmate is both competent to make legal choices
and motivated to accept just punishment. If not, and suicidal ideation appears to be the
motivating factor for waiver the courts should not permit waiver of appeal. Article also
includes hypotheticals and statistical appendices.
Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisonerson Death Row. Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and
Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169 (2005).
This article focuses on the difficulties that mentally ill defendants may suffer after the
sentencing stage, identifying three grounds upon which execution of mentally ill
prisoners should be precluded: defendants whose diminished comprehension of the
circumstances of the punishment leaves them incompetent under Fordv. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986) to execute; defendants whose mental illness lessens their ability
to assist in their own defense or contribute in a vital way in post-conviction relief; and
defendants who wish to waive their right to post-conviction review either by failing to
initiate proceedings or terminating post-conviction proceedings as a means of
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challenging the validity of the conviction. Through his discussion, the author links
each of the above defendant groups to the correlating relevant text of the ABA Task
Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty proposal. While a proponent of the
ABA Recommendations and a member of the Task Force committee, the author goes
on to conclude that even with adoption the proposals are not a panacea and that
difficult legal problems will continue to arise for condemned prisoners suffering from
mental illness.
Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman:Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human
Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257 (2007).
This article reviews the decision in Panetti v. Quarterman,551 U.S. 930 (2007), with
the author reviewing trial proceedings as well as the litigation regarding the
defendant's competence for execution. The article discusses the federal jurisdiction to
consider the habeas corpus claim under Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) and
the Court's creation of an exemption to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
PenaltyAct (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(2) restriction on "second or successive"
federal habeas petitions. The author concludes by determining that Panetti serves to
expose two substantial problems to the fair administration of the death penalty-first,
the failure of the criminal justice system to take into full and proper consideration the
effects of severe mental illness on capital litigation in regards to the fair defense of
mentally ill defendants and claims of diminished capacity and second, the failure to
correct these deficiencies in post-conviction proceedings. The author concludes by
identifying an even larger problem exposed in Panetti;that of the failure of the state
appellate courts to enforce the Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence, and
the Supreme Court's reluctance to aggressively impose the principles and doctrines
established on the issues against the state courts.
Susan M. Borland, Walking the Edge ofDeath. An AnnotatedBibliography on Juveniles, the
Mentally Ill, the Mentally Retarded and the Death Penalty, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 131 (2001).
This bibliography, prepared in 2000, consists of annotated references to periodical
articles, books, web sites, and Supreme Court cases that examine the application of the
death penalty to juveniles, the mentally ill, and the mentally retarded. It is not
comprehensive. The bibliography has been organized under three subject headings: I.
Juveniles; II. Mentally Ill; and III. The Mentally Retarded. The three subject headings are
further subdivided into: A. Supreme Court Cases; and B. Books, Articles, and Web Sites.
It is a useful resource for information prior to 2000.
J. Richard Broughton, Essay, The Second Death of CapitalPunishment,58 FLA. L. REv. 639
(2006).
This essay critiques Supreme Court death penalty cases, specifically presenting a
constitutionalist analysis of recent cases involving categorical exemptions from capital
punishment( i.e. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005)), and those cases involving reliance on federal collateral litigation to restrict
imposition of capital punishment. The author uses these cases as examples to show the
incremental elimination strategy of capital punishment abolition through litigation.
According to the author this strategy causes the erosion of the scope and availability of
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capital punishment. The author concludes that Atkins and Roper have distorted the
objective national consensus standard and rendered it irrelevant in light of the Court's
understanding of its own authority under the Eighth Amendment. The author further
surmises that the distortion is gradually bringing about the death of capital punishment by
allowing the Supreme Court to supplant itself, over political institutions, as the main
forum of debate on the death penalty and allowing the use of subjective and experimental
evidence to show the public's concern about the execution of the "innocent."
J. Richard Broughton, The Roberts Court and the Death Penalty Code, 12 JONES L. REv. 145
(2008).
This article looks at the role the Supreme Court has played in checking the government's
use of the death penalty and how this role has resulted in what the author identifies as "a
body of judicial pronouncements amounting to the crafting of a Death Penalty Code."
After looking briefly at past Court administrations, the author reviews three possible
issues that may come before the Roberts Court. The first issue is how to approach
questions about whether to exempt certain groups of defendants from the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment. The author, noting the movement towards the creation of
exemptions for the mentally ill as typified by the American Bar Association
Recommendations, finds it likely that constitutional litigation on this question will reach
the Court, calling for a re-examination of the existing categorical exemption framework.
The author concludes by stating it is unlikely that the Roberts Court will move
dramatically in a new direction in its capital cases, but that it remains to be seen whether
the Roberts Court will continue to follow or revise the prior Courts' death penalty
agendas.
Bethany C. Bryant, Comment, ExpandingAtkins and Roper: A DiagnosticApproach to
Excluding the Death Penaltyas Punishmentfor Schizophrenic Offenders, 78 Miss. L. J. 905
(2009).
This comment addresses whether individuals suffering from schizophrenia should be
exempt from the death penalty. The author begins by reviewing the history of capital
punishment in the United States by laying out the foundation for challenging the death
penalty as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Bryant then
performs a detailed analysis of the Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) decisions before comparing the mental limitations of
those with schizophrenia and those with mental retardation. The author looks at
diagnosis, etiology, symptomatology and treatment of both illnesses. Based on this
analysis, the author concludes that objective evidence exists to support that schizophrenic
offenders like those suffering from mental retardation should not be subjected to the
death penalty. Finally, the author suggests that legislative efforts need to be established to
reflect society's evolving standards on the matter and that courts, juries, and the general
public need to be further educated about schizophrenia.
Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is There Hopefor a
Just Jurisprudencein an Era ofResponsibility/ConsequencesTalk?, 57 ARK. L. REzv. 447
(2004).
This article examines the dichotomy that exists between public dialogue regarding the
mentally ill and their treatment under criminal law. Examined and discussed are four
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case studies of mentally ill defendants and how contemporary criminal law lacks a
studied and serious approach to mental disorder. The author argues as to how the
modernization of criminal law has created an unrealistic and unworkable perception of
culpability, which has been passively accepted by the Supreme Court through its
deference to state legislative judgments. The author then discusses the influence
conservative politics and religious fundamentalism has played in politicizing
dangerousness and dehumanizing offenders. The author argues that this behavior has
created an inflexible sentencing system incapable of taking individual circumstances
into consideration. The article raises the question of whether the US can develop a
more enlightened and mature means of dealing with mentally ill offenders. In doing so,
the article reviews the federal government's recent recognition of the plight of the
mentally ill, its grants for establishment of mental health courts, and recent Supreme
Court decisions such as Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which recognize the
critical relationship between culpability and punishment.
Julie D. Cantor, OfPills and Needles: Involuntarily Medicating the Psychotic Inmate When
Execution Looms, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 119 (2005).
This article discusses the Eighth Circuit decision in Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018
(8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 832 (2003), posing the question of whether the
Eighth Amendment permits a death row inmate, who is legally insane unless medicated,
to be forcibly medicated for the purpose of making him eligible for execution. The article
reviews the rights of the mentally ill both in the civil and criminal setting and finds that
the psychotic inmate's liberty interest in bodily integrity yields when the inmate poses a
danger to himself or others and medicating him is in his medical best interest. The article
continues on with a discussion of Singleton and the arguments surrounding the issue of
forced medication, including discussion on the medical ethics of medicating for the
purpose of execution. The author concludes by arguing that the Eighth Circuit decision in
Singleton was correct and that it is "ethical and perhaps even required for physicians to
medicate death row inmates."
Lawrence Connell, The Supreme Court, Foreign Law, and ConstitutionalGovernance, 11
WIDENER L. REv. 59 (2004).
This article reviews the use of foreign law to invalidate state criminal laws. The author,
through an analysis of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003), demonstrates how the Court's reliance on foreign law to justify its
interpretation of the Constitution is illogical and symbolic of the Court's habit of
improper interference with state legislatures over laws when they are in conflict with
international norms. The article includes a brief review of how the Court used foreign and
international laws in their decision process in the above cases and contains a discussion
of why there should be no place for the consideration of foreign and international law in
cases regarding the mentally ill and the death penalty in the Court's interpretation of the
United States Constitution. The author concludes that the use of these laws is
inappropriate and dangerous, and it creates a negative effect on the balance of power and
American sovereignty. The author suggests proposals for the prevention of the extension
of these precedents.
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Patricia Cooper, Competency ofDeath Row Inmates to Waive the Right to Appeal: A Proposalto
Scrutinize the Motivations ofDeath Row Volunteers and to Consider the Impact ofDeath Row
Syndrome in DeterminingCompetency, 28 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. (2009).
This article discusses the task of determining competency when death row inmates waive
their right to appeal. The article reviews Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966), reviewing
the Rees' two-prong standard for determining competence. This article argues that the
Rees standard is unworkable and is often misapplied, and the Court's failure in Rees to
address inmates' motivation for their decisions to waive appeals renders the standard
inadequate. To resolve this problem, the author supports the recommendation of the
American Bar Association Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, which
calls for the addition of a third prong to enhance and clarify the standard adopted in Rees.
This prong asks: "Is the prisoner who seeks execution able to give plausible reasons for
doing so that are clearly not grounded in symptoms of mental disorder?" The article also
includes a discussion of the theory of "Death Row Syndrome" which espouses the
premise that the mental stress of prolonged exposure to death row can cause, in and of
itself, incompetency in death row inmates.
Rebecca J. Covarrubias, Comment: Lives In Defense Counsel's Hands: The Problems and
ResponsibilitiesofDefense Counsel RepresentingMentally Il or Mentally Retarded Capital
Defendants, 11 SCHOLAR 413 (2008-2009).
This comment, using the example of Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp.2d 814 (2008),
reviews the issue of death row inmates with serious mental illnesses who are entitled to a
death penalty exemption but have been overlooked by defense counsel and the courts
because of the difficulty in identifying them as mentally ill. This comment examines the
difficulties inherent in identifying a defendant's mental illness or mental retardation and
the relevant case law regarding the exemption of the mentally ill and mentally retarded
for the death penalty. The article reviews Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986),
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). It
also looks at evolving public consensus on executing the mentally ill and mentally
retarded through an examination of current state legislation, review of the consensus of
the international community, and the positions held by mental health organizations and
the American Bar Association on the death penalty. The author concludes by arguing that
the Supreme Court's failure to define and direct how and when states should provide a
mental health or competency evaluation has led to inconsistencies that complicate the
assessment process and that the Court in Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
places the burden on defense counsel to make reasonable investigations into mitigating
evidence, especially in regard to a death sentence.
Phyllis L. Crocker, Not to Decide is to Decide: The U. S. Supreme Court's Thirty-Year Struggle
with One Case about Competency to Waive Death PenaltyAppeals, 49 WAYNE L. REv. 885
(2003-2004).
This article discusses the history of Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966), a death penalty
case first accepted by the Supreme Court in 1965 as a case of first impression, but which
remained on the Court's docket for thirty years until it was dismissed in 1995. Crocker
provides extensive archival research on the internal operations of the Court, reviewing
correspondence, motions, responses, and internal memos and showing the different
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avenues the Court considered in attempting to deal with the case. Rees, which
exemplified the first attempt by a petitioner to waive a death penalty appeal, forced the
Court to establish a procedure for determining a petitioner's competency to waive postconviction relief. The author concludes that an examination of Rees offers not only
historic value but contemporary relevance for litigators and courts seeking guidance on
how to proceed in death penalty cases when the death row inmate may be incompetent.
Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics,Adjustment, and
Confinement: A CriticalReview of the Literature,20 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 191 (2002).
This article reviews and summarizes research on death row inmates. The article evaluates
the strengths and weaknesses of the three most prevalent types of death row research:
demographic data, clinical studies, and research from institutional records. The article
includes discussion on ethnic distribution, women on death row, juvenile offenders,
intellectual ability, educational achievement, psychological disorders, neurological
disorders, neuropsychological deficits, substance abuse and intoxication at capital
offense, dysfunctional family history, self-representation capability, violence on death
row, and death row conditions and confinement. The article reaches several conclusions,
including that there is significant incidence of neurological and neuropsychological
abnormalities among death row inmates. Psychological disorders are quite frequent, and
the adverse conditions in some jurisdictions serve to aggravate psychological symptoms.
The author concludes that current prison mental health service and interventions are
insufficient and that the establishment of comprehensive mental health services are
needed.
Sarah F. DePanfilis, Singleton v. Norris: Exploring the Insanity ofForcibly Medicating, then
Eliminating,the Insane, 4 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 63 (2004).
This note examines the recent Eighth Circuit Court decision in Singleton v. Norris, 319
F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 832 (2003). The note includes a brief
history of American perceptions on the "insane," a summary of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," and a historic overview of the use of
capital punishment on the mentally ill. The note continues with an examination of mental
health law on the subject of forcible medication including a review of Washington v.
Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990), Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), and Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The author also reviews the Court's efforts to address
whether a person deemed incompetent may be forcibly medicated in order to restore
competency for execution by reviewing State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992) and
Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993), which reached different conclusions on the
matter than the Eighth District in Norris. The note proceeds to examine the Supreme
Court's recent use of categorical exceptions from the death penalty to clarify the Court's
reasoning, comparing Singleton to the underlying principles of exemptions afforded other
groups like the mentally retarded and juveniles. The note then reviews the development
and use of psychotropic medication and their side effects., and the role of antipsychotic
medication in the forced competency of death row inmates for execution. The author
looks at the various ethical codes guiding the medical field and the position of medical
professionals on the issue of the treatment of mentally ill patients for the ultimate goal of
achieving competency for execution. The note concludes with suggestion for alternate
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solutions to the forced medication of the mentally ill for execution and advocates for the
United States Supreme Court to revisit the issue.
Bruce Ebert, Competency to be Executed: A ProposedInstrument to Evaluate an Inmate's Level
of Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment ProhibitionAgainst the Execution of the
Presently Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. Ev. 29 (2001).
This article reviews the history surrounding the analysis of determining whether an
individual is competent to be executed. The author begins his discussion with the
Supreme Court's holding in Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), particularly
reviewing Justice Powell's concurrence opinion which established a two-prong
competency standard. The article goes on to review the conditions and diagnoses which
can result in a finding of incompetency and focuses on insufficient intellectual
functioning, psychopathology, and dementia. The author then discusses the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death PenaltyAct (AEDPA) and its negative effect on death row appeals.
The author concludes by offering guidance and presenting an outline for a process which
could be employed in evaluating the competency of death row inmates, an example of
which is included in Table Two of the article. Includes tables.
Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Challenge and Dilemma of Chartinga Course to Constitutionally
Protect the Severely Mentally Ill CapitalDefendantfrom the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV.
529 (2011).
This article looks at which capital defendants are suitable for execution under the
precedents established in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, (2005), and Kennedy v. Louisiana,554 U.S.407 (2008), in which the Supreme
Court limited capital punishment to the "narrow category" of offenders who commit the
most serious crimes and whose "extreme culpability" makes them the most worthy of
execution. Entzeroth examines these issues as applied to capital defendants who suffer
from severe mental illness at the time of the commission of their crime by reviewing the
characteristics of severe mental illness and its prevalence among capital offenders and the
death row population. The author provides analysis of the development of the modern
American death penalty and the position of the severely mentally ill offender within that
structure. The author begins with an examination of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) and Gregg v. Georgia,428 U.S. 153 (1976), concluding that these cases form the
constitutional basis of the modern death penalty. The article expounds that while the
Court is not willing to find the death penalty unconstitutional, it has established
exemptions for certain groups of individuals upon which the death penalty may not be
constitutionally imposed. The discussion considers how the Court crafts and justifies
these death penalty exemptions and how state legislative action plays a critical role in
their development, as typified by the decisions in Atkins and Roper. The article then
reviews the current Eighth Amendment protection for "insane" prisoners at the time of
execution as cruel and unusual punishment as reiterated in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551
U.S. 930 (2007), concluding that while strong comparisons can be made between the
position and status of the severally mentally ill and existing exemptions, these
exemptions are remarkably narrow and offer little or no protection for those suffering
from severe mental illness. Entzeroth then provides a state by state analysis of state
legislative action to ban the execution of the mentally ill, concluding that while some
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states are raising constitutional concerns in regards to imposition of the death penalty on
the severely mentally ill, there is currently no evidence of a national consensus. The
author concludes that the future of the constitutional death penalty exemption for the
severely mentally ill is as dependent on the state legislative process as it is on the Court
and that Atkins and Roper alone are not determinative on the subject and that a stronger
record of a "national consensus" against the execution of the severely mentally ill is
necessary on the state legislative level.
Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Illusion ofSanity: The Constitutionaland Moral Danger of
Medicating Condemned Prisonersin Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REv. 641 (2009).
This article considers the fate of those death row inmates whose mental illness meet
the Supreme Court exemption to the death penalty established in Fordv. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Panettiv. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), but whose
mental condition appear to be alleviated or lessened by the voluntary or involuntary
use of antipsychotic medication. The article reviews the constitutional doctrine that
exempts death row inmates from execution under the Eighth Amendment. The article
then reviews case law that allows the state, under certain circumstances, to administer
antipsychotic medication involuntarily to mentally ill prisoners, including in part
Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990), Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992),
and Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The article then reviews the
constitutional and ethical problems raised by executing those whose competency is
only assured through forced medication. The article proceeds to review the American
Bar Association's recommendation on the imposition of the death penalty on the
severely mentally ill and concludes by recommending that the Eighth Amendment's
exemption of the insane be extended to cover individuals whose sanity can only be
restored through medication.
Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishment,86 WASH. U. L. REv. 859 (2009).
This article argues that Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), established a doctrinal
shift which puts the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in direct
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The article reviews
the history of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis and the
legislative enactments created in response to Atkins. It proceeds to discuss medical
conditions that give rise to the same cognitive, behavioral, and adaptive limitations in
Atkins but that are not included in statutory definitions adopted pursuant to the Atkins
decision. The author examines the arguments of other scholars who expound on the
extension of Atkins to other subject groups, determining that these groups have a far
weaker Eighth Amendment claim than Atkins and that an argument based on a due
process claim is equally flawed. The author concludes that when the Court shifted its
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause to carve out category exemptions, it created an arbitrary and unequal application
of the Eighth Amendment to similarly situated individuals and that legislative enactments
based on that shift are now ripe to be challenged on Equal Protection grounds. Includes
tables.
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Kelly A. Gabos, The Perils ofSingleton v Norris: Ethics and Beyond, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 117
(2006).
This note discusses the ethical ramifications for physicians and mental health
professionals created by the allowance of the "forcible medication" of death row inmates.
The note begins with a look at the prevalence of mental illness in the criminal justice
system and a review of cases involving the involuntary medication of mentally ill
defendant and death row inmates. The note proceeds with a discussion of physician
participation in executions throughout the United States, and the ethical principles and
guidelines of various medical and psychological organizations. The author focuses on the
ethical consideration and the impact of physician participation on the physician-patient
relationship. The author concludes by finding the Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 832 (2003) decision deficient for its failure to consider
execution in an analysis of whether involuntary medication is a medically appropriate
treatment for an incompetent death row inmate. The author further argues that the
position in which physicians are placed as a result of this legal posture contradicts the
very nature of their professional identity, and also inappropriately influences the
treatment of mentally ill prisoners. The author suggests applying a stricter standard then
the one developed in Singleton which would require that the treatment must not only be
medically appropriate, but should be the best medically appropriate treatment for that
particular patient. The author further concludes that all of the impacts of involuntary
medication on the patient should be considered and that physicians should be free to
explore other appropriate symptom-alleviating treatments where available.
Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the Evolving Standards ofDecency: The
Supreme Court's CapitalJurisprudencePost-Roper, 45 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 561 (2006).
This article examines the Supreme Court's decisions in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) by mapping out the course of the
Supreme Court capital punishment jurisprudence since its decision in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972). The author, through an overview of capital punishment
jurisprudence, argues that the Court, specifically by the overturning of Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), revitalized the death
penalty debate by seeking to maximize human dignity through the creation of
"categorical exemptions" expanding the "qualitative difference" doctrine and the
broadening of the Eighth Amendment analysis first established in Furman. Ghoshray
argues that in these decisions the Court has established new relaxed standards which
subordinate traditional Eighth Amendment analysis allowing the court to adopt a more
moral centric standard. The article also examines what the author concludes is a
coincidental relationship between the Court's current position on capital punishment with
doctrinal shifts in the Roman Catholic Church under the leadership of the late Pope John
Paul II. The author finally delves into possible long-term implication of the Court's
decision in Atkins and Roper and the potential obstacles faced by the Court if its intention
is to make significant changes to current capital jurisprudence doctrine, concluding that
the absence of credible objective standards along with the evidence of inconsistent
application of the death penalty requires the Supreme Court to act through the creation of
prohibitions against the death penalty for those who are diagnosed with severe mental
illness at any point along the judicial process.
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Anthony E. Giardino, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death Penalty:
Addressing the Impact ofPost-TraumaticStress Disorderand Traumatic Brain Injury, 77
FORDHAM L. REv. 2955 (2009).
This essay calls for the creation of special consideration when determining whether the
death penalty should be imposed on combat veterans who suffer from service related
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI). The essay argues
that these combat veterans are a distinct and special population of offenders who should
be treated differently for purposes of the death penalty. The essay addresses the different
types of mitigating evidence that a combat veteran can present during the sentencing
phase of a capital trial, including military training, which desensitizes veterans to the act
of killing, diminished culpability, symptoms of PTSD that alter behavior and judgment,
and symptoms of TBI such as emotional disturbance, personality changes, and deficits in
intellectual and adaptive functioning. The essay then looks at the categorical exclusions
created by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) comparing combat veterans with PTSD and TBI to minors and mentally retarded
death row inmates on the issue of limited culpability. The author argues that there should
be a narrow categorical exclusion created for certain combat veterans, and concludes that
because the existence of service related PTSD or TBI reduces personal culpability,
combat veterans cannot be considered as "among the worst offenders" and are thus
undeserving of the ultimate sanction of the death penalty.
Timothy S. Hall, Mental Status and Criminal Culpabilityafter Atkins v. Virginia, 29 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 355 (2004).
This essay explores the implication of the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) in the context of mental health law and the doctrines
governing the relationship of the mentally disordered to the criminal justice system.
The author argues that the Atkins decision departs from the traditional treatment of the
mentally disordered and raises questions about the relationship between mental health
science and the law. The essay examines the two major doctrines of mental health law
as it applies to criminal law: insanity and competence. The author outlines both
doctrines. The article then focuses on competence, with the author discussing Atkins'
contribution to the body of law surrounding capital punishment and the mentally
disordered, exploring some of the issues raised by the Atkins decision including: the
extension of Atkins to other mental disabilities, the relationship between diagnosis and
law, and due process and the determination of competence for execution. The author
specifically looks at Atkins and state statutes governing the mentally retarded, how the
Courts have implemented Atkins, federal habeas relief, and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death PenaltyAct (AEDPA). The essay concludes that it is too early to
predict whether Atkins foretells a new era of categorical exemption from capital
punishment, but offers an example of the social consensus that mental status matters in
issues of crime and culpability, and of the social confusion over precisely how and
when it matters.
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Ronald S. Honberg, The Injustice ofImposing Death Sentences on People with Severe Mental
Illness, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1153 (2005).
This article discusses the impact of mental illness on the fairness of court proceedings
in capital cases and argues for the categorization of mental illness as a per se
mitigating factor. The article focuses on how the risk of mistakes are significantly
greater when the defendant is severely mentally ill, and discusses several situations
under which capital cases involving the mentally ill can become difficult. The author
identifies several standard issues that arise in capital cases: the defendant's
competency either to participate in his or her own defense or his or her competency to
be executed; defendants who refuse to allow their legal representation to present
evidence of mental illness; juror prejudice based on the defendant's demeanor under
medication as remorseless, or the involuntary medication of a defendant to make him
or her competent to stand trial or be executed; the problem of individuals with mental
illness who do not want to be defended or have their convictions appealed; and the use
of "dueling experts" which often only serve to bias and confuse jurors. The author
concludes that the ABA Task Force Recommendations are a good start at handling the
difficult issues involved with capital cases and the mentally ill, but that it will take a
systematic state-by-state effort to enact legislation providing actual protection and that
a Supreme Court decision settling the issue is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
Laurie T. Izutsu, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to CapitalDefendants with Severe Mental
Illness, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 995 (2005).
This note calls for a definitive exemption for individuals with severe mental illness
from the death penalty. The note first looks at the Supreme Court's use of a
proportionality review to guarantee that the use of the death penalty meets Eighth
Amendment requirements. Thereafter, the note reviews the decision in Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and its discussion on the reduced moral culpability of
the mentally retarded in capital cases. It analyzes the framework of the rationale used
by the court in Atkins, substituting the mentally ill for the mentally retarded to show
that people who suffer from severe mental disorders should also be considered less
morally culpable and exempt from the death penalty. The note also includes a review
of state death penalty statutes, the views of several state justices, experts, as well as
members of religious and other world communities, and case studies.
Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling ofFederalism. The Illogic of Using State Legislation as
Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REzv. 1089 (2006).
This article discusses the use of state legislation as evidence of an evolving national
consensus on matters regarding death penalty jurisprudence. As an example of this trend,
the author particularly focuses on Supreme Court cases that have created categorical
exemptions for the death penalty. The article argues that although the practice of using
state legislation as evidence of evolving national consensus is often justified in terms of
deference to state legislatures, it is actually harmful to the concept of federalism. The
author sets forth four reasons why the use of state legislation as evidence of evolving
consensus actually harms the interest of the states: it imposes uniformity on states that are
meant to be free to pursue diverse policies; the current means of assessment can allow
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one state undue power to determine the constitutionality of a mode of punishment for all
other states; failure to take the differences in state population into consideration can lead
to illusory consensus; and future state majorities cannot reverse a death penalty
exemption once enacted in the Constitution short of an Article V amendment or a judicial
revocation, even if "national consensus" shifts. The article concludes by stating that the
use of state legislation is subjective and flawed in both its conception and practice, and
consequently it should be explicitly rejected by the Court.
Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority ofAmericans Say Death PenaltyApplied Fairly, GALLUP
NEWS SERVICE (May 20, 2002), http://www.gallup.com/poll/6031/Slim-Majority-AmericansSay-Death-Penalty-Applied-Fairly.aspx.
This is a poll released prior to the decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),
that found that the majority of Americans opposed the death penalty for the mentally
retarded (82%), for the mentally ill (75%), and for juvenile offenders (69%). The
results are based on telephone interviews with a randomly selected national sample of
1,012 adults, 18 years and older, conducted May 6-9, 2002.
Liliana Lyra Jubilut, Death Penalty andMental Illness: The Challenge ofReconciling Human
Rights, CriminalLaw, and PsychiatricStandards.6 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 353 (2007).
This article looks at the current debate regarding the death penalty and the mentally ill
from an international human rights perspective. The author's discussion centers on the
proposals made by Amnesty International and the American Bar Association after the
decision in Atkins when both advocated for the categorical expansion of the death
penalty exemption to the mentally ill. The author provides a critical analysis of both
proposals, looking at their key tenets and discussing their strengths and weaknesses
before ultimately finding both documents inadequate, and centering on abolitionist
theories rather than on the protection of the intellectually disabled as an at-risk
population. The author proceeds to recommend a counter proposal that calls for
increased due process protections and fair resolution for mentally ill defendants,
emphasizing improved access to medical care, and the adoption of an interdisciplinary
approach between human rights, criminal law, and psychiatry.
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Undiscovered Country: Execution Competency & Comprehending
Death, 98 Ky. L. J. 263 (2009-2010).
This article reviews the question of the extent a mentally ill capital defendant must
understand the concept of the termination of life as a punishment. The article reviews the
history and policy behind the ban on the execution of the insane, finding its roots in the
Anglo-American common-law and the policies of deterrence and retribution. The article
proceeds to examine key Supreme Court decisions regarding the standard for determining
competency to be executed, including Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and
Panettiv. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). The author then considers the use of
statutory definitions of competency, finding that a number of states fail to provide such
definitions and offer little guidance regarding the standards of competency. The author
notes that where statutory definition exists, states require an understanding or awareness
of the crime and corresponding punishment but fail to define an awareness standard. The
article continues to examine how lower courts have dealt with decisions regarding death
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comprehension, The author concludes that the Constitution requires a death
comprehension test that finds a condemned mentally ill individual incompetent if they do
not comprehend that the execution will mean the end of the their physical life.
Dora W. Klein, CategoricalExclusionsfrom CapitalPunishment:How Many Wrongs Make a
Right?, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 1211 (2007).
This article looks at the categorical exclusions created in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), arguing that both decisions
overstated the uniformity and universality of traits associated with diminished culpability
among mentally retarded and juveniles. The author attempts to answer the question "Do
the wrongs of capital punishment nevertheless make the Court's decisions in Atkins and
Roper right?" The author proposes that in answering this question it is necessary to
consider the implications for both offenders excluded from capital punishment and those
not excluded. The article first looks at the Supreme Court's reasoning in Atkins and
Roper, arguing that the Court failed to recognize the impact of categorical exclusions on
non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders. The author argues that the blanket
exception does not consider offenders who are excluded under the exemption but who are
not necessarily less culpable than offenders who remain subject to the death penalty,
thereby allowing for unequal and arbitrary treatment of equally culpable offenders. The
article proceeds to discuss the effects of Atkins and Roper on the broader capital
punishment system, finding that these decisions allow for unfairness and inconsistency in
sentencing and create a false sense of justness. The article concludes that capital
punishment after Atkins and Roper might appear more just, but that appearance is
misleading when considering the consequences of categorical exclusions on nonexcluded offenders.
Chris Koepke, Note, Panetti v. Quarterman:Exploring the Unsettled and Unsettling, 45 Hous.
L. REv. 1383 (2008-2009).
This note reviews the Supreme Court decision in Panetti v. Quarterman,551 U.S. 930
(2007) focusing on the third holding of the Court. There the Court rejected the Fifth
Circuit's test for determining the competency to be executed as too restrictive, because it
failed to take into consideration evidence of delusional beliefs that might prevent a
prisoner from having a "rational understanding" of the state's reasons for seeking to
impose the death penalty. First, the note reviews the facts of the case, the Court's analysis
on the competency issue, and the dissenting opinion. Then, the note discusses the
shortcomings of the Supreme Court's decision. The author argues that the Supreme Court
has diminished a clear and workable standard and replaced it with a problematic
schematic for assessing mental competency by suggesting that the Eighth Amendment
requires a death row prisoner to possess a rational understanding of the reason for their
pending execution. The author argues that the Court misconstrued Fordv. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986), relied on a flawed policy, and failed to conduct the requisite
constitutional analysis required under the Eighth Amendment. The article concludes by
stating that Panetti provides little in the way of answers and it is unlikely to result in
greater substantive protections of the mentally ill, ultimately serving only to add
additional "hollow" language to Ford determinations.
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Michael Mello, Executing the Mentally II: When is Someone Sane Enough to Die?, 22 CRIM.
JUST. 30 (2007-2008).
This article, written by Michael Mello, an opponent of the death penalty and a member
of the Public Defenders' office that worked on the Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986) appeal, presents a personal account and analysis on three death row cases.
Ford, Martin v. Wainwright,479 U.S. 958 (1986), and Panettiv. Quarterman,551
U.S. 930 (2007). The article focuses on the Constitution's prohibition on executing the
presently insane, with the author noting that "mental illness is pervasive among the
congregation of the condemned." This article explores the Supreme Court's attempt to
resolve the key question of when someone is sane enough to die. The author posits that
the Court has failed to provide an answer to this question, arguing that Ford never
adequately identified precisely why executing the insane violates evolving standards
of decency and that the Ford case left open more questions than it answered. A
situation repeated in Panetti,which also fails to set down an express rule governing
competency determinations. The author concludes by stating that we as a country
execute the mentally ill, we executed them "after Ford and before Panetti", and this
policy is unlikely to change.
Mental Capacity and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. (Special Issue) 277
(2006).
This 2006 issue of the Saint Louis University Public Law Review focuses on issues
surrounding mental capacity and the death penalty. It includes the articles: Executing
People with Mental Disabilities:How We can Mitigate an AggravatingSituation, by
Ronald J. Tabak, on the 2005 Recommendations of the American Bar Association's
Task Force on the Mental Disability and the Death Penalty; Mental Health Courts and
Title II of the ADA. Accessibility to State Court Systems for Individualswith Mental
Disabilitiesand the Needfor Diversion, by Ronda Cress, J. Neil Grindstaff and S.
Elizabeth Malloy, on the challenges facing mental health courts and the nonaccessibility of conventional courts to the mentally ill; Mental Illness and the Death
Penalty, by Eileen P. Ryan and Sarah B. Berson, (see separate annotation); Capital
Punishment andMental Health Issues: Global Examples, by Peter Hodgkinson,
Founder and Director of the Centre for Capital Punishment Studies at the University of
Westminster School of Law in London, along with Nicola Browne, Seema Kandelia,
and Rupa Reddy, on international role of physicians and psychiatrists in the capital
punishment process; The Insanity Defense: History and Problems, by James Hooper,
on society's lack of knowledge regarding mental illness and the view that the insanity
defense is just an elaborate way for the individual to defy justice; and an introduction
by Chief Justice Michael Wolff of the Missouri Supreme Court, Tinkering with the
Machinery ofDeath-Mental Capacity,Ability, and Eligibilityfor the Death Penalty.
Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REzv. 255
(2003).
This article gives a psychiatrist's perspective to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002), and looks at potential problems raised for courts that handle death penalty
cases. The article reviews the increased level of psychiatric involvement in capital
cases called for by the Supreme Court, and determines that such involvement will only
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further complicate the already complex and capricious process. The article looks at the
1989 Supreme Court decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), focusing on
the role that evidence of mental retardation played in the pre-Atkins decision. Turning
to Atkins, the article then reviews the role that mental health professionals will be
expected to play in future court determinations. The article compares the Supreme
Court's diagnostic process in Atkins to the actual process of diagnosing mental
retardation and the ambiguities of the process that are often distorted for legal effect.
The author proceeds to describe the contradiction between mental health organizations'
response to Atkins and their traditional position on the use of diagnoses for nonclinical purposes, concluding that Atkins will increase the role of psychiatrists and
psychologists in capital cases but warns against an overreliance on medical diagnosis
as an excuse for behavior rather than merely a component in a larger informed
judgment.
John W. Parry, The Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities:A Lethal Dose of
Stigma, Sanism, Fear of Violence, andFaulty PredictionsofDangerousness,29 MENT. & PHYS.
Dis. REP. 667 (2005).

This short article, written in support of the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death
Penalty Recommendations, discusses the difficulty that individuals with obvious mental
disabilities have in receiving a fair trial and execution. The author reviews "sanism," the
concept of "irrational prejudice, due to a person's mental or emotional disability, that is
based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization", which
can be found rampant throughout the legal community. The author finds that sanism, in
correlation with the stigma of mental illness, can lead to subjective pretextual decisionmaking such as the faulty reliance on the concept of dangerousness, and can make it
virtually impossible for defendants with mental disabilities to be seen in a positive light
once they enter the criminal justice system. The article also discusses the use of
predictive psychological evaluations such as risk assessment and subjective clinical
judgments to determine dangerousness despite their lack of empirical support. The article
concludes with a discussion on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), a case that was
not decided until the end of the Task Force's deliberations, with the author suggesting that
the decision in Roper could serve to offer even greater protection to the mentally disabled
than considered in the ABA Recommendations.
Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 259 (2009).
This article discusses the negative affect defendants' mental impairments have on the
appellate process. The author calls for the reconceptualization of defendant competence
as it relates to appeal proceedings. The article reviews the decision in Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), in which the Court established a defendant's right to have a
competency evaluation before proceeding to trial, state statutory schemes, and the current
American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards on the
protection of the mentally ill at trial. The author reasons that they all serve to adequately
protect the rights of mentally disabled defendants at trial, but preclude any serious
consideration of whether defendant capacity might be essential on appeal. The author
notes a lower court trend of ignoring the impact of appellant disability and focuses on a
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counter-trend exemplified by the decision in Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576 (7th Cir.
2007), which recognizes that in many cases defendants' competency at the appellate level
is crucial to due process of law, and necessary for the effective assistance of counsel. The
author also suggests that the Supreme Court's decision in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S.
164 (2008) has created an opening for the development of a more individualized
approach to the concept of competence. In conclusion, the author suggests a more
comprehensive, contextualized, and client-centered approach to capacity in all levels of
criminal process, including appeal, and urges for the redrafting of the ABA's Criminal
Justice Mental Health Guidelines.
Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 351 (2006).
This article discusses the difficulties involved in attempting to exempt the mentally ill
from the death penalty, putting forth the argument that if any categorical exemption is
created it should only apply to those defendants suffering from Axis I disorders in
which there are psychosis. The authors start by reviewing Supreme Court decisions
involving the death penalty, beginning with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
and ending with a discussion of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). The article proceeds to review the legal arguments
against the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally ill and the problems of
using mental illness as an incremental abolition of the death penalty. The authors also
discuss the reaction of professional mental health organizations to the Atkins decision
and the American Bar Association Task Force Recommendations on mental disability
and the death penalty. The article goes on to examine the various disorder and clinical
entities that could potentially qualify for exemption under the American Bar
Association Task Force Recommendations, contrasting Axis I psychiatric disorders
with psychosis from personality disorders and traumatic brain injuries. The author
concludes that any exemptions should be reserved for Axis I disorders where there
would be minimal debate regarding the presence of severe mental illness and severe
functional impairment.
David A. Sadoff, InternationalLaw and the Moral Precipice:A Legal Policy Critique of the
Death Row Phenomenon, 17 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77 (2008-2009).
This article attempts to clarify the nature, scope, and meaning of the "death row
phenomenon" or; the concept that a capital punishment inmate is inadvertently subjected
to inhumane treatment due to the intense mental suffering and debilitating circumstances
endured on death row. The author reviews Soering v United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 439 (1989), in which the defendant, facing charges of capital murder, fought
extradition to the United States by arguing that it could expose him to "inhumane and
degrading treatment and punishment" i.e. death row phenomenon or death row syndrome.
The author summarizes the relevant international and domestic case law, recognizing the
validity of the death row phenomenon as well as the political reaction it has elicited. The
article then attempts to critically evaluate the legitimacy of a phenomenon claim from a
legal policy perspective. It concludes with recommendations for proposed judicial
approaches for evaluating the legitimacy of the phenomenon claim in both ex post and ex
ante contexts.
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Christopher Seeds, The Afterlife of Ford andPanetti. Execution Competence and the Capacity
to Assist Counsel, 53 ST. Louis U. L. J. 309 (2008-2009).
This article reviews the decision in Panetti v. Quarterman,551 U.S. 930 (2007), focusing
on whether executing prisoners with severe mental illness, who lack the capacity to assist
counsel, contravenes evolving standards of decency. The article begins with a review of
the prohibition on executing individuals with severe mental illness before and after Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The author argues that in Fordthe Court eliminated
the element of a defendant's capacity to assist counsel from the assessment of
competence for execution. The author proceeds by reviewing Justice Marshall's call for
clarification on the issue in Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1240 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). The article then argues that Panetti,as the first
interpretation of Ford,opens the way for new elucidation of this matter and concludes
that following Panetti,the substantive Fordinquiry is open to a reassessment.
Paula Shapiro, Comment: Are We Executing Mentally Incompetent Inmates Because They
Volunteer to Die?. A Look at Various States' Implementation ofStandards of Competency to
Waive Post-ConvictionReview, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 567 (2007-2008).
This comment discusses the subject of "volunteers", death row inmates who decide to
waive their right to post-conviction review of their sentences. The author argues that
the failure in Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) to give guidance on its
requirement that a competency determination take place prior to the execution of any
capital defendant who waives their post-conviction right to an appeal, has led the
states to establish inconsistent standards for determining inmate competency. The
author further argues that the lack of uniform and specific standards significantly
increases the chance of mentally incompetent inmates being executed unlawfully. This
comment examines four states' procedures for determining an inmate's competency to
waive post-conviction review: Montana, Nevada, Ohio, and South Carolina-all states
in which a volunteer was executed in 2006. The author concludes by advocating for
the uniform adoption of five basic procedural requirements by all states in order to
ensure adequate and consistent standards for determining competency to waive postconviction relief as a means to safeguard incompetent inmates' rights and to ensure
that they are not being executed solely because they volunteer to die.
Helen Shin, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near? The Impact ofAtkins and Roper on the
Future of CapitalPunishmentfor Mentally Ill Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 465 (October
2007).
This note examines the feasibility of the future exclusion of the mentally ill from the
death penalty and the impact it might have on the ongoing debate regarding the overall
validity of the death penalty. The author begins with an examination of the relevant
history of capital punishment in the United States, explaining the Supreme Court's
rationale for upholding the death penalty as a form of punishment. It discusses Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), setting
forth the Supreme Court's criteria for creating an exemption for particular classes of
offenders. The author then applies the test established in Roper and Atkins to analyze
whether or not mentally ill criminals should be exempt from the death penalty by
reviewing the issue of national consensus. The note then provides an overview of
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relevant state capital punishment law in the United States, looking at the
proportionality analysis of the Supreme Court and discussing the implications of an
exemption for the mentally ill. The author concludes that while there is a growing
consensus against subjecting the mentally ill to the death penalty in the foreign arena,
and that among legal, mental health and medical experts there is no visible sign of an
objective legislative multistate consensus on the issue. The author recommends that
state legislatures that still sanction capital punishment reexamine whether executing
the mentally ill comports to the Atkins and Roper decisions.
Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorderas an Exemptionfrom the Death Penalty The ABAIRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1133 (2005).
This article discusses the first two recommendations of the American Bar Association
Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, both of which call for a
prohibition on the execution of offenders whose mental disorder has rendered them
less culpable at the time of the offense. The article first presents the language of the
recommendation, then the related commentary approved by the Task Force
Committee, concluding with a brief discussion of possible controversies that may arise
from each recommendation. The author discusses the severe mental disorder or
disability requirement, the significant impairment requirement, the Task Force's
express exclusion of offenders whose disorder is attributable solely to the use of
alcohol and/or drugs, as well as those offenders whose only diagnosis is antisocial
personality disorder. The author also looks at how the recommendations relate to the
insanity defense and to mitigating factors, concluding that the two recommendations
of the American Bar Association Task Force recognize the diminished responsibility
caused by serious mental disorders and guarantee the treatment of mental illness as a
mitigating, and not aggravating, factor.
Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENT. & PHYs. Dis. L. REP.
667(2000).
This article sets forth three arguments on why the death penalty should not be used or
rarely used on the mentally ill. The first argument is a constitutional challenge based on
Equal Protection, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment's injunction requiring Equal
Protection is violated by the different treatment of groups when there is no justification or
relevant differences to support the differentiation. The second argument does not
challenge constitutionality, but makes a due process argument based on the states'
repeated failure to follow their own statutory provisions by treating mental illness as an
aggravating factor in the death sentence determination. The third argument, based on the
Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986) Eighth Amendment bar on the execution of the
incompetent, suggests that under a properly construed competency analysis most
mentally ill defendants would prove incompetent under Ford.The author argues if the
defendant is found competent, it is only because they have been medicated for the sole
purpose of allowing their execution.
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Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Meanfor People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L.
REv. 293 (2003).
This essay discusses whether states that prohibit the execution of juveniles or the
mentally retarded violate the Equal Protection Clause by continuing to authorize the
execution of the mentally ill. The essay begins by reviewing the Court's Eighth
Amendment's analysis in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), ultimately finding that an expansion of the exemption
in Atkins to the significantly mentally ill fails to meet the criteria necessary for a viable
Eighth Amendment argument due to a lack of statutory evolution on the issue. The
article goes on to discuss the possible expansion of the Court's analysis to the
significantly mentally ill through an Equal Protection argument. Using a review of
Equal Protection case law, the author makes a comparison between the mentally
retarded, juveniles, and the significantly mentally ill and examines the level of
comparison and persuasion necessary for a successful expansion of the exemption.
The author concludes that differentiating between individuals with significant mental
illness, mental retardation and juveniles in the application of the death penalty is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Laura Snodgrass & Brad Justice, "Death is Different": Limits on the Imposition of the Death
Penalty to Traumatic Brain Injuries, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 81 (2007).
This article discusses whether the Court limitation on the imposition of the death
penalty should be expanded to include individuals with traumatic brain injuries (TBI)
which result in permanent, cognitive, physical, emotional, and behavioral disabilities.
The article discusses the recognized nexus between brain damage and violent crime,
arguing that individuals with brain injuries are at higher risk to commit violent crimes
and therefore at a higher risk to face the death penalty. Using the rationale set out in
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),
the article compares individuals with brain injuries to individuals with mental
retardation and to juveniles. The article proposes an initial analytical approach for
resolving underlying issues, including where to draw the line between mild and severe
brain damage, how to properly diagnose such individuals and how to recognize them
when they enter the criminal justice system. The author concludes by arguing that
evidence shows that individuals with TBI show many of the same disabilities,
functional limitations and behavioral manifestations as those associated with the
mentally retarded and juveniles, marked by a lower level of culpability. The author
concludes that execution of such persons would fail to serve the purpose of retribution
and deterrence necessary under an Eighth Amendment analysis and does not
correspond with evolving standards of decency.
Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman:Is There a "Rational Understanding"of the Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?,5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285 (2007).
This article reviews the case of Panettiv. Quarterman,551 U.S. 930 (2007), focusing on
tensions and uncertainties created by its holdings and its place in the complex body of
capital punishment law. The article looks at each of the Court's findings individually,
determining that the Court remained non-committal overall in its holdings, first by
finding the Fifth Circuit test "too restrictive" but declining to set down a general rule to
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govern competency determination. Second, by holding that the lower court's
determination of competency was inadequate but failing to set down the procedures for
lower courts to follow. The author argues that the most significant holding in Panetti is
its interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996 (AEDPA),
permitting Panetti to file his Fordclaim in a second habeas petition, and the important
consequences not only for death row petitioners with Ford claims, but also for all habeas
petitioners in future interpretations of AEDPA. The author continues with an analysis of
the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, looking at what she identifies as key
questions about the proper scope of Eighth Amendment constraints on punishment and
the methodology for determining that scope. The author concludes that Panetti brings us
no closer to a rational understanding of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence but does illuminate some of the difficulties that will present themselves in
the future.
Sarah A. Sulkowski, The AEDPA and the Incompetent Death-Row Prisoner:Why FordClaims
Should be Exempt From the One-Year and One-Bite Rules, 6 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L 57 (2004).
This article examines the two major sources of current procedures governing Ford
claims: the common law imminence requirement, set down in Herrerav. Collins, 506
U.S. 390 (1993), and the Antiterrorism andEffective Death PenaltyAct of 1996
(AEDPA) which set limits on when and how petitioners may raise Fordclaims in
federal court. Written pre Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), this article
suggests changes to ensure that Fordclaims are available to those who need them. The
article argues strict application of AEDPA to Fordclaims is both unnecessary and
constitutionally impermissible, calling for the exemption of Ford claims from the
scope of AEDPA. The article details the requirements imposed under the common law
imminence rule and by AEDPA, the federal courts' divergent interpretations of
AEDPA, and examines several possible solutions for Fordpetitioners. The article
concludes that exemption of Ford claims from AEDPA's scope gives practical effect
to the right not to be executed while incompetent and backs this conclusion through
the examination of analogous cases in Supreme Court and other federal jurisprudence.
Symposium, Beyond Atkins: A Symposium on the Implications ofAtkins v. Virginia, 33 N M.
L. REv. 173 (2003).
This 2003 symposium issue of the New Mexico Law Review focuses on the implications
of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). It includes the articles: DisabilityAdvocacy
and the Death Penalty: The Roadfrom Penry to Atkins, by James W. Ellis, the attorney
who represented Atkins, reviewing the relationship of advocates on legislation and thus
on the courts through the methodology of Eighth Amendment interpretation;
Adolescence, Mental Retardation,and the Death Penalty, by Victor L Streib, and Atkins,
Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic:Rationalesfor a CategoricalExemptionfor
Juvenilesfrom CapitalPunishment,by Jeffrey Fagan, both discussing the death penalty
and juvenile offenders anticipating the 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005); Atkins v. Virginia: A PsychiatricCan of Worms, by Douglas Mossman, M.D.,
(see separate annotation); What Atkins Could Meanfor People with Mental Illness, by
Christopher Slobogin, (see separate annotation); "Life is in Mirrors,Death Disappears":
Giving Life to Atkins, by Michael L. Perlin, focuses on the meaning of Atkins for the
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advocacy community offering seventeen issues that should be considered in
implementation; and Straight is the Gate: CapitalClemency in the United Statesfrom
Gregg to Atkins, by Elizabeth Rapaport, which looks at the executive clemency decisions
in capital cases.
Symposium, Culpabilityand the Death Penalty The Intersection ofLaw andPsychology, 11
WIDENER L. REv. 1 (2004).
This 2004 Symposium issue of the Widener Law Review focuses on the topic of
culpability and the death penalty. It includes the articles: Off the Rails on a Crazy
Train?. The StructuralConsequences ofAtkins and Modern Death Penalty
Jurisprudence,by J. Richard Broughton, on the Supreme Court's use of the Eighth
Amendment to interfere with state capital sentencing schemes and the resulting
negative effects on state sovereignty; Atkins v. Virginia,Federalism,and Judicial
Review, by Charles Hobson, arguing that the Court's use of proportionality review to
create a categorical exemption for the mentally retarded has no basis in the Eighth
Amendment protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment and is likely to prove
more problematic than beneficial; Justice Deferred, Justice Denied: the Practical
Effect of Atkins v. Virginia, by Elaine Cassell, which looks at the problems
surrounding the fair application of Atkins to mentally retarded defendants; The
Supreme Court, ForeignLaw, and ConstitutionalGovernance, by Lawrence Connell,
(see separate annotation); The Differing Conceptions of Culpabilityin Law &
Psychology, by Donald N. Bersoff, on how the differing concepts of culpability in law
and psychology affect how society views and administers punishment and how the
Supreme Court and organized psychology ignores and misuses social science data,
directly impacting how the death penalty is administered; Applying Principlesof
ForensicMental Health Assessment to CapitalSentencing, by Kirk Heilbrun, et al.,
discussing the call in Atkins for increased use of mental health professionals to conduct
forensic mental health assessments in capital sentencing evaluations; Into the Briar
Patch: EthicalDilemmas FacingPsychologistsFollowingAtkins v. Virginia, by Linda
Knauss and Joshua Kutinsky, which examines the ethical challenges created by the
Atkins decision for psychologists' and calls for the creation of clear professional
boundaries regarding their roles in death penalty cases; Comment: Atkins v. Virginia:
The FalseFinding of a National Consensus and the Problems with Determining Who
is Mentally Retarded, by Kimberly A. Meany, critiquing the Court's decision in Atkins
as inherently flawed due to the lack of national consensus against the execution of the
mentally retarded and for failing to define mental retardation inviting constitutional
challenge; and a forward by Geoffrey Marczyk and Lawrence J Connell.
Symposium: The Death Penalty andMental Illness, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1113 (2005).
This 2005 Symposium issue of the Catholic University Law focuses on issues
surrounding mental penalty and the mentally ill. It includes the text of The American
Bar Association recommendations, Recommendations of the American Bar
Association Section ofIndividual Rights andResponsibilities Task Force on Mental
Disabilitiesand the Death Penalty, and includes the articles: Overview of Task Force
Proposalon Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, by Ronald J. Tabak, (see
separate annotation); Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the Death Penalty: The
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ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, by Christopher Slobogin, (see separate
annotation); The Injustice ofImposing Death Sentences on People with Severe Mental
Illness, by Ronald S. Honberg, (see separate annotation); Mentally Il Prisonerson
Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures,by Richard J. Bonnie, (see
separate annotation); and an introduction by Richard C. Dieter, Introduction to the
Presentations:The Path to an Eighth Amendment Analysis ofMental Illness and
CapitalPunishment.
Symposium: The Honorable James J. Gilvary Symposium on Law, Religion, andSocial Justice:
Evolving Standards ofDecency in 2003 - Is the Death Penalty on Life Support, 29 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 195 (2004).
This 2004 Symposium issue of the University of Dayton Law Review focuses on the
topics of law, religion, social justice, and the evolving standards of decency. It includes
the articles: Keynote Address HonorableJames J. Gilvary Symposium on Law, Religion,
and Social Justice: Evolving Standards ofDecency in 2003 - Is the Death Penalty on Life
Support, by Erwin Chemerinsky, addressing the implications of the most recent Supreme
Court decisions on the death penalty and suggesting that they signal a fundamental
change in how the Court views its imposition; The Death Penalty Experiment: The Facts
Behind the Conclusions, provides an objective overview of the history of the death
penalty in the United States and its status as it stood in 2003; The Innocence Revolution
and Our "Evolving Standards ofDecency " in Death PenaltyJurisprudence,by Mark A.
Godsey & Thomas Pulley, discusses how public perceptions of the death penalty are
changing due to initiatives like the Innocence Project; Evolving Standards ofDecency:
Cracks in the Foundation,by Denise LeBoeuf, discussing the inherent flaws within the
justice system that render the death penalty unjust; Conscience of a Catholic Judge, by
Michael R. Merz, addressing the issues of conscience faced by Catholic judges asked to
participate in death penalty determinations; Drunk, Sleeping, and Incompetent Lawyers:
Is It Possible to Keep Innocent People offDeath Row, by Ira Mickenberg, discusses the
problems of willful blindness to ineffective capital representation; CapitalPunishment
and the Citizens of Ohio, by Andrew Oldenquist, and Retribution and the Death Penalty,
by John Murphy, discussing deterrence and retribution and examining some of the
reasons why most Americans still currently favor capital punishment and its role as a
valuable tool in law enforcement; Death is Different: An Essay Consideringthe Propriety
of UtilizingForeign Case Law in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence,by Joseph Brossart,
on the propriety of utilizing foreign case law in determining the prevailing standards of
decency; Mental Status and CriminalCulpability after Atkins v. Virginia,by Timothy S.
Hall, (see separate annotation); and a forward by Lori Ellen Shaw, Assistant Dean of
Students and Professor of Lawyering Skills at the University of Dayton School of Law.
Symposium: "The Past, Present,andFuture of the Death Penalty", 76 TENN. L. REv. 505
(2009).
This 2009 Symposium issue of the Tennessee Law Review presents a collection of
articles and essays drawn from the Tennessee Law Review's Colloquium; "The Past,
Present, and Future of the Death Penalty," held at the University of Tennessee College of
Law on February 6 and 7, 2009. Includes the articles: Adjudicating Claims ofInnocence
for the Capitally Condemned in Tennessee: Embracing a Truth Forum, by Dwight Aaron,
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advocating for the creation of a "truth forum" in the state of Tennessee; Evidence of
Racial Discriminationin the Use of the Death Penalty A Story from Southwest Arkansas
(1990-2005) with Special Reference to the Case ofDeath Row Inmate Frank Williams,
Jr., by David C. Baldus, et al., presents an augmented version of the study submitted to
the Parole Board on Williams' behalf, setting forth an empirical and scholarly basis for
the argument that racial prejudice is a key factor in death penalty proceedings; Racism,
Wrongful Convictions, and the Death Penalty, by Hugo Adam Bedau, reviewing the
arguments of death penalty opponents who fall into two standard categories: those who
argue the death penalty is wrong because of the risk of executing the innocent and those
who argue that it is wrong because it is inherently racially biased. The article evaluates
both positions, weighing their impact on the overall goal of abolishing the death penalty;
An EmpiricalLook at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in CapitalCases, by John H.
Blume, et al., analyzes state legislative and judicial responses to Atkins through the use of
empirical data; The Illusion of Sanity The Constitutionaland Moral Danger of
Medicating Condemned Prisonersin Order to Execute Them, by Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth,
(see separate annotation); ProsecutorialError in Death Penalty Cases, by Gilbert Stroud
Merritt, Jr., examining prosecutorial misconduct in capital cases; TreatedDifferently in
Life but Not in Death: The Execution of the Intellectually Disabledafter Atkins v.
Virginia, by Penny J. White, illustrating the repercussions of the different state judicial
interpretations of Atkins prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded; Competency
for Execution: The Implications of Communicative Model ofRetribution, Pamela A.
Wilkins, (see separate annotation);and an introduction by Lane McCarty and Leslie
Mund who served as Co-Chairs of the Colloquium.
Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People with Mental Disabilities:How We Can Mitigate an
Aggravating Situation, 25 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 283 (2006).
This article discusses the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty
Recommendations and their acceptance by the American Psychiatric Association in 2005,
the American Psychological Association in 2006, and the American Bar Association in
2006. The article goes on to discuss some of the basis for the proposal and discusses the
support of the Constitution Project, a blue ribbon committee on the death penalty, that in
2006 released a revised set of recommendations which includes a provision regarding the
mentally ill, as well as members of the judiciary who support a capital punishment
exemption of those with serious mental disabilities. Also includes examples of
problematic cases which may fall under the recommendations.
Ronald J. Tabak, Mental Disability and CapitalPunishment: A More RationalApproach to a
DisturbingSubject, 34 HuM. RTs. 5 (2007). Also availableat http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/human rights magazine home/human rights vol34_2007/spring2007/hr spring07
tabak.html.
This article provides a brief summary of the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities (IRR) Task Force on Mental Disability and the
Death Penalty Recommendations. The article summarizes the task force's conclusions
and relies heavily on the supporting report presented to the ABA House of Delegates.
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Ronald J. Tabak, Overview of Task Force Proposalon Mental Disability and the Death Penalty,
54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1123 (2005).
This article describes the 2003 creation of the American Bar Association (ABA) Section
of Individual Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death
Penalty, which explored whether individuals with mental illness should be exempt from
execution, taking note of the decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The
Task Force included twenty-four lawyers, mental health professionals, and academics.
The author served as the chair of the Task Force. The article lays out the work of the
Task Force and the underlying concerns, and points the Task Force considered in
reaching its recommendations. The Recommendations were adopted by the ABA's
policymaking body, the House of Delegates, in August 2006.
Peggy M. Tobolowsky, To Panetti and Beyond-Defining andIdentiying CapitalOffenders
Who are too "Insane to be Executed, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 369 (2006-2007).
This article examines the evolution of the definition of "insanity" for purposes of the
ban on the execution of insane offenders, as well as the accompanying procedures to
identify these capital offenders. The article reviews the common law prohibition of the
execution of insane offenders and the adoption of the common law prohibitions by
American states, as well as the current status of state law prior to the decision in Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The article also reviews the current status of state
law prior to the decision in Panettiv. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) and addresses
the impact that the Court's decision in Panetti could have on various state insanity or
competency definitions and procedures. The article describes illustrative cases of death
row inmates whose cases could have been or could be affected by the Court's decision
in Panetti.The author concludes by reviewing the Court's additional guidance in
Panettiand twenty years of experience following Ford,proposing a model definition
and implementation procedure to identify mentally impaired offenders who lack the
requisite competence for execution. Includes appendix of state statutes or controlling
court decisions regarding the prohibition of the execution of insane or incompetent
offenders.
Brian W. Varland, Marking the Process of a MaturingSociety: Reconsideringthe
ConstitutionalityofDeath PenaltyApplication in Light ofEvolving Standards ofDecency, 28
HAMLINE L. REv. 314 (2005).
The article looks at the Eighth Amendment and death penalty issues and the author's
perceived shift in the Supreme Court, as typified by the decisions in Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), to take into
consideration past issues and the "evolving standards of decency" of a maturing
society. The author shows the evolution of the Eighth Amendment "evolving standards
of decency" rule through a review of Supreme Court decisions and discusses the
adoption and use of the standard in capital cases over the last three decades,
culminating with the decisions in Atkins and Roper, which overturned an earlier ruling
by the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989). The author then continues with his analysis of how the "evolving
standards of decency" principle evolved into a controlling constitutional rule, and
concludes that the Court's movement towards reviewing past death penalty issues

Vol. 5 No. 2 Mattimoe

50

through the "evolving standards of decency" of a maturing society could serve as a
viable means for the "incremental abolition" of the death penalty by the Supreme
Court.
Pamela A. Wilkins, Competency for Execution: The Implications of a Communicative Model
ofRetribution, 76 TENN. L. REv. 713 (2009).
This article attempts to establish an appropriate constitutional test for competency to be
executed. The author argues that in the past, most of the various tests that have been
adopted or proposed either fail to consider the purpose for the Eighth Amendment ban or,
though taking into account the reason for the ban, are not structured to ensure that
decisions will be based on accurate scientific determinations. The article provides
background data on the endemic nature of mental illness on the states' death rows, death
row conditions which are likely to exacerbate inmate existing mental health issues, the
treatment of mental health during the capital trial process, and the problematic
constitutional jurisprudence about competency to be executed. The article addresses
retributive theory and the Eighth Amendment and the implications of that theory for the
formation of a substantive constitutional test for competency to be executed. The article
looks at several potential approaches to determine competency to be executed, including
the Hazard-Louisell approach, the Atkins and Roper base Approaches, Mental State
approaches and American Bar Association (ABA) Recommendation 122A. The author
concludes that only the ABA Recommendation is based on a proper understanding of
retribution and is scientifically practicable, taking into account the Eighth Amendment's
heightened reliability standards for capital cases.
Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking CategoricalProhibitionson CapitalPunishment: How the
Current Test FailsMentally Ill Offenders and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REv. 423
(2009).
This article deals with whether the Eighth Amendment should be held to prohibit the
imposition of death sentences upon offenders with severe mental illness. The article
examines the current Eighth Amendment test for categorical prohibitions and its potential
application to the severely mentally ill. The article provides an overview of punishment
theory, deserts, and deserts limitation as a means to understanding what constitutes "cruel
and unusual" punishment. The author argues that retribution is a deserts-based theory and
the Eighth Amendment incorporates a deserts-limitation principle which bars states from
imposing punishment beyond what an offender deserves. The author further argues that
the use of categorical prohibitions, which combines an assessment of society's evolving
standards with the Court's independent assessment of proportionality, follows the
deserts-limitation model but concludes that the current test for categorical prohibitions
does not provide an adequate deserts-limitation test and should be abandoned. The author
proceeds to offer a new four element test that rethinks categorical exclusions in light of
deserts.
Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Emerging Death PenaltyJurisprudence:Severe Mental
Illness as the Next Frontier,50 B. C. L. REv. 785 (2009).
This article explores recent Supreme Court decisions and the seeming willingness of
the Court to invalidate the death penalty for certain offenses and classes of offenders
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based on a disproportionate punishment argument, proposing that mental illness be the
next logical step in such an analysis. The author first reviews the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the proportionality requirement and when capital punishment is
disproportionate within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, concludes that
although there is no current record of legislative action toward abolition and an
absence of evidence of evolving social standards of decency, the Court could easily
find that the execution of offenders with severe mental illness violates the
proportionality standard through the exercise of independent judgment. The author
then continues by considering the similarity amongst severe mental illness, mental
retardation, and juvenile status, concluding that the Court's proportionality approach
should also be applied to mentally ill offenders whose disability at the time of the
crime caused functional impairment that significantly diminished their culpability and
deterrability. Finally the article analyzes the standards that should be considered when
making an Eighth Amendment determination, reviewing those mental illnesses that
could satisfy the standard and suggesting how to address such a determination
procedurally on a case-by-case basis.
V. WEBSITES

A.B.A. Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/individual rights/projects/deathpenalty moratorium implementationproject.html.
Official American Bar Association (ABA) website for the ongoing Death Penalty
Moratorium Implementation Project launched in 2003 to implement the association's
call for a moratorium on executions in the United States, pending review in each
capital punishment jurisdiction's laws and procedures in death penalty jurisprudence.
This site includes links to the key findings and compliance charts for the state
assessment project, as well as links to the individual state assessments. Site also
includes links to a brief history of ABA policy on the death penalty, links to ABA
policy documents, a link to ABA Amicus Curiae briefs, Supreme Court updates, and
information on the death row population in the United States.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mental Illness And The Death Penalty, http://www.aclu.org/capitalpunishment/mental-illness-and-death-penalty-0.
This website is part of American Civil Liberties Union Capital Punishment Project a
national project that engages in public education and advocacy, systemic reform and
strategic litigation. It includes direct representation of capital defendants and links to
cases, news, blogs, and legal documents related to the death penalty and mental illness.
Amnesty Int'l, Abolish The Death Penalty, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty.
Official website on Amnesty International's (AI) death penalty abolition efforts. This
site includes extensive information concerning the international use of the death
penalty, Al reports on the death penalty, including reports concerning the mentally ill,
and death penalty statistics. Site also includes a website library that contains reports,
press releases, action appeals, and newsletters.
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Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't OfJustice, CapitalPunishmentStatistics, http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid= 18.
This website is the primary source for criminal justice statistics on capital punishment. It
includes data on persons held under sentence of death and persons executed during the
calendar year from the state departments of correction and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The page summarizes issues facing death row inmates, including data on offenders' sex,
race, origin, education, marital status, age at time of arrest for the capital offense, and
legal status at time of the offense.
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Mental Illness And The Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/mental-illness-and-death-penalty.
This is the Death Penalty Information Center's (DPIC) official website on the topic of the
mentally ill and the death penalty. The DPIC, a non-profit organization, serves the media
and the public with analysis and information on issues concerning capital punishment.
The Mental Illness and the Death Penalty page provides links to other resources
(including American Bar Association Resolutions), articles and texts on mental illness,
important and recent cases, sentence reversals in intellectual disability cases, statistics,
polls and studies, and news and developments dealing with the subject of the mentally ill
and the death penalty.
Nat'1 Inst. Of Mental Health, Statistics, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/index.shtml.
This website is a publication of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) a part of
the National Institutes of Health, a component of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. The site provides statistics and facts about mental disorders and also
includes a link to references.

